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NOTES
ONE MAN CORPORATIONS-SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The one man corporation is a strange phenomenon not only to the
lay mind,' but even to modem corporate law. The spectacular growth of
the public corporation has shaped the statutory law of the last century to
meet problems created by huge enterprises.2 As a result the recognition
of the one man corporation and the determination of its legal incidents
has been an entirely judicial task.8 The existence of such a juridicial
concept can be turned to practical business advantage to the extent that it
allows an individual the choice of having his legal relations flow from the
rules the courts invoke in the name of that concept. 4 It is the purpose of
this note to examine some aspects in the range of that choice.5
1. Rin'xY, WALL STRmEE AND MAIN SmEET 64, 65 (1927) commenting on
Salomon v. Salamon v. Salomon, [1897] A.C. 22 which was the first case to recog-
nize judicially the one man corporation in England:
"The House of Lords on the other hand, concluded the matter by holding
that, inasmuch as all legal formalities had been duly observed, there was no
fraud. Fraud or no fraud to the lay mind the whole flimsy pretext more than
borders on the ridiculous. It rather controverts the famous characterization of
Disraeli, that 'the legal mind chiefly displayed itself in illustrating the obvious,
explaining the evident, and expatiating on the common place."'
LATrY, SunswimA~Es AND AFFILIATm CORPORATIONS 192 (1936): "Whatever
difficulty etymologists may have in considering one man a 'company' or a 'corpora-
tion,' to the jurist the sole stockholder is not a conceptual impossibility, at least so
long as the jurist thinks in terms of the functions of the corporate device in a given
social and economic order,- rather than in terms of the essential and eternal nature
of the corporations."
2. Cf. Dodd, Statutory Developmnents in Bisitess Corporatio Law, 1886-1936,
50 HARv. L. REv. 27, 43 (1936) : ". . . the draftsman of the new statutes . . .
have . . . sought to conform the provisions of the corporation to the business prac-
tices of the present day ratner than attempts to bring about any substantial change
in those practices."
3. Hollywood Cleaning and Pressing Co. v. Hollywood Laundry Service, Inc.,
217 Cal. 124, 17 P.2d 709 (1932); Staacke v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W.
994 (1922); Tilley v. Coykendall, 172 N.Y. 587, 665 N.E. 574 (1902). See Fuller,
The Incorporate Individital, A Study of the Otte Man Corporation, 51 HARV. L. REv.
1373, 1374. Two states do provide for incorporation by one man, IowA CODE § 491.2
(1935); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.3 (Henderson, 1937).
4. The state legislatures have never amended the statutory law in order to cope
with the problems presented by the one man corporation. Corporation codes of
practically every state require that at least three men must combine in order to form
a corporation, and the control of the corporation is given to a board of directors
which must be composed of at least three men.
5. The chronological development of the one man corporation has paralleled the
evolution of the parent-subsidiary relationship. (The ownership of the entire capital
stock of one corporation by another corporation is essentially another form of the
one man corporation). The parent-subsidiary relation has many elements which
are similar to the one man corporation and cases in each field will be helpful in
analyzing problems in the other field. For an excellent appraisal of the parent-sub-
sidiary relationship, see LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS (1936).
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LIABILITY OF ONE MAN CORPORATION FOR AcTs OF SOLE STOCKHOLDER
Authority of Sole Stockholder to Bind His Company.-Since in most
instances the sole stockholder assumes the management of the business, the
question arises whether he has the legal authority to bind the corporation
when he purports to act in its behalf for admittedly proper corporate pur-
poses. In some early cases it was held that he did not. In Union National
Bank v. State National Bank 0 the sole stockholder executed a mortgage in
the name of the corporation. In a suit between the mortgagee and another
creditor, the court found the mortgage invalid. But this exceptionally
technical approach has gradually disappeared since the turn of the century
and today in most states the sole stockholder may bind the corporation by
his own acts.
7
The corporation has been held bound, even though it would cause cor-
porate property to be devoted to personal use of the sole stockholder.8 For
instance, a corporation was required to pay a note signed in its name in
payment of a personal debt of the sole stockholder,9 and on a note signed
by the sole stockholder executed in payment for purchase of the outstanding
capital stock of the corporation.'0
In most of the cases it was found that the sole stockholder was also
the president of the corporation." This provides an alternative ground for
liability of the corporation, since most courts generally hold a corporation
liable for acts of the president or managing agent of the corporation, when
his acts are within the normal authority of such an officer.12 Therefore,
6. 155 Mo. 95, 55 S.W. 989 (1900); In English v. Dearborn, 141 Mass. 590,
6 N.E. 837 (1886) a chattel mortgage was executed in the corporate name by the
sole stockholder and given to the sole stockholder's father as security for pre-existing
indebtedness of the corporation. In a controversy between the mortgagee and a subse-
quent purchaser the mortgage was held invalid because its execution was not author-
ized by the Board of Directors; see 15 MicH. L. REv. 264 (1917).
7. Copeland v. Swiss Cleaners, 52 So.2d 223 (Ala. 1951) ; Muirhead v. Fairlawn
Enterprise, Inc., 72 R.I. 163, 48 A.2d 414 (1946); Community Stores Inc. v. Dean,
I Terry 566, 14 A.2d 633 (1940); Cope Swift Co. v. John Schlaff Creamery Co.,
131 Minn. 82, 184 N.W. 550 (1923); Norma Mining Co. v. Mackay, 241 Fed. 640
(9th Cir. 1917).
8. Cf. Carozza v. Fed. Finance and Credit, 149 Md. 223, 131 At. 332 (1925),
where a one man corporation borrowed money at usurious rate of interest. Usury
law not applicable to corporations. Sole stockholder pledged personal property for
debt.: Held, that the lender could foreclose.
9. State National Bank v. Encinal Mercantile Co., 277 S.W. 398 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925).
10. Copeland v. Swiss Cleaners, 52 So.2d 223 (Ala. 1951).
11. Supra note 7.
12. Moyse Real Estate Co. v. First National Bank, 110 Miss. 620, 70 So. 821
(1916); Lloyd and Co. v. Mathews, 223 Ill. 477, 79 N.E. 172 (1906): "A corpora-
tion can act only through its agents, and the president of a corporation, as the agent
and corporate representative, has the power, in the ordinary course of business and
in furtherance of the corporate interest, to execute contracts and to bind the com-
pany in so doing. He is, by virtue of his office recognized as the business head of the
company and any contract pertaining to the corporate affairs, within the general
powers of such officers, executed by the president on behalf of the corporation, will,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed to have been done by authority
of the corporation."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 42 (Purdon 1950): "The by-laws of a business cor-
poration shall operate merely on regulations among the shareholders of the corpora-
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holding corporations bound by the acts of their sole stockholders is merely
a manifestation of the rule holding the corporation liable for acts of its
authorized officers.
Nevertheless, a different doctrine still persists in some jurisdictions.13
In recent cases it has been held that a lessee's lease was forfeited even
though the covenants were broken with consent of the sole stockholder of
the lessor corporation,14 and that a sole stockholder has no authority to hire
an employee to perform clerical duties,' 5 and that the sole stockholder has
no authority to bind the corporation to pay a bonus to an employee. 16
The courts which deny the right of a sole stockholder to bind his cor-
poration are courts which are generally reluctant to pierce the corporate
veil in other cases. They are courts which extinguish the separate identity
only when necessary to prevent fraud and injustice. This is interpreted
to mean the attempt by the sole stockholder to use the corporation for an
improper purpose. Evidently these courts do not view this class of cases
as within that interpretation.
1 7
The denial of the right of the sole stockholder to bind his corporation
has been criticized as absurd.' 8 It certainly ignores the realities of the one
man corporation. The trend of the cases is in the direction of giving the
sole stockholder the same authority as is ordinarily possessed by the board
of directors.' 9
Use of Corporate Property for Personal Benefit of Sole Stockholder.-
There are several typical situations in which the sole stockholder uses cor-
porate property for personal purposes. This is to be distinguished from the
previous section where the obligations were for a corporate purpose, and
the question was whether the sole stockholder, acting alone, had authority
to bind the corporation. For example, X may wish to purchase all of the
tion, and shall not affect contracts or other dealings with other persons, unless such
persons have actual knowledge of such by-laws. Any form of execution provided in
the by-laws to the contrary notwithstanding, any note, mortgage, evidence of indebted-
ness, contract, or other instrument or writing, or any assignment or endorsement
thereof, executed or entered into between any corporation and any other person,
copartnership, association or corporation, when signed by the president or vice-
president and secretary or assistant secretary or treasurer of such corporation, shall
be held to have been properly executed for and in behalf of the corporation."
13. See In re Chubby's Parkchester, 94 F. Supp. 701 (D.C. N.Y. 1951); Med-
linsky v. Premium Cut Beef Co., 320 Mass. 22, 67 N.E.2d 762 (1946) ; McDonough
v. Connolly, 313 Mass. 62, 46 N.E.2d 576 (1943).
14. Dos Pueblos Ranch and Improvement Co. v. Ellis, 8 Cal.2d 617, 67 P.2d 340
(1937).
15. Garmire v. McDonough and Co., 197 Ill. App. 527 (1944); cf. Rothberg
v. Manhattan Coil Co., 66 S.E.2d 390 (Ga. 1951), court held that Chairman of
Board of Directors who was principal stockholder had no authority to sell real prop-
erty of the corporation. Court does not mention the percentage of his holding and
cites no authority.
16. McIlrath v. S. Waterbury & Sons, 193 App. Div. 491, 184.N.Y. Supp. 886
(1920).
17. Cf. In re Winders Estate, 221 P.2d 193 (Cal. App. 1950) ; Bourne v. San-
ford, 327 Mich. 175, 41 N.W.2d 175 (1950). Executor of sole stockholder has no
right to manage corporation, or perform specific acts for the corporation.
18. Fuller, supra note 7, at 1406.
19. Renault v. L. N. Renault and Sons, 188 F2d 317 (3d Cir. 1951); Edwards
v. Plains Light and Water Co., 49 Mont. 535, 143 Pac. 962 (1914).
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stock of M corporation. X may now own some 2 0 or none of it.21  In
paying for the stock X may use corporate property 22 or may execute a note
in the name of the corporation,23 generally mortgaging corporate property
to secure the obligation.24  X may borrow money from a bank expressly
for personal use, although binding the corporation to repay.25 X may divert
property of the corporation to pay for personal expenses.23
In a suit brought when the corporation has a surplus by the holder of
an existing corporate obligation against the corporation, the holder is always
permitted to recover when there are no other creditors.27  Even when
other creditors exist, the obligation is enforced, for in reality the situation
does not differ from an absence of creditors.28  Other creditors have no
proper interest in the manner that the surplus is used by the equity group.29
No action may be brought by the corporation to recover property ap-
propriated for personal use unless the claims of creditors are involved.30
If creditors do not exist, it is then conclusively presumed, that no act of the
sole stockholder could have been detrimental to the corporation.3 1
But if the corporation is insolvent, and the claims of other creditors
exist, the right of the trustee to recover from the recipient disbursements
for non-corporate purposes made prior to insolvency will depend upon the
financial status of the corporation at the time the payment was made. If
the corporation had a surplus at the time of the payment, recovery is
denied.32 If the corporation was insolvent at the time payment was made,
recovery is clearly indicated.m If the corporation was solvent, but the
20. Scales v. Holje, 41 Cal. App. 733, 183 Pac. 308 (1919) ; Lummons v. Crosby,
181 App. Div. 884, 162 N.Y. Supp. 44 (1916).
21. Sargent v. Palace Cafe Co., 175 Cal. 737, 167 Pac. 146 (1917).
22. Corely v. Cozart, 115 F. 2d 119 (5th Cir. 1940); Stony Brook Lumber Co.
v. Blackman, 286 Pa. 305, 133 Atl. 556 (1926).
23. In re Haas, 131 Fed. 232 (7th Cir. 1904) ; Grand Rapids Tire Co. v. Ben
Rose Tire Co., 264 Mich. 268, 249 N.W. 847 (1933).
24. Levine v. Sun Drug Co., 65 Ohio App. 513, 30 N.E. 815 (1939).
25. Norma Mining Co. v. Mackay, 241 Fed. 640 (9th Cir. 1917).
26. M. Edirose Silk Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 338 Pa.
139, 12 A.2d 40 (1940); Murtland Holding Co. v. Egg Harbor Commercial Bank,
123 N.J. Eq. 117, 196 Atl. 230 (1993); Scales v. Holjes, 41 Cal. App. 733, 183
Pac. 308 (1919); Hanson Sheep Co. v. Farmers and Traders Bank, 53 Mont. 324,
163 Pac. 1151 (1917); Little v. Garabrant, 90 Hun 404, 35 N.Y. Supp. 689,
aff'd, 153 N.Y. 661, 48 N.E. 1105 (1897).
27. Copeland v. Swiss Cleaners, 52 So.2d 223 (Ala. 1951); Sargent v. Palace
Cafe Co., 175 Cal. 737, 167 Pac. 146 (1917).
28. Cf. O'Neill v. Finnessey, 299 Pa. 97, 149 AtI. 103 (1930).
29. It has been held that a sole stockholder can devise and bequeath corporate
property. In re Bauer's Will, 289 N.Y. 326, 45 N.E.2d 897 (1942); I re Dillon's
Will, 105 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
30. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Becklenberg, 300 Ill. App. 453, 21 N.E.2d 152
(1939); Stony Brook Lumber Co. v. Blackman, 286 Pa. 305, 133 Atl. 556 (1926).
31. Murtland v. Egg Harbor Bank, 196 Atl. 230, 123 N.J. Eq. 117 (1938).
32. Edirose Silk Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 338 Pa. 139,
12 A.2d 40 (1940); O'Neill v. Finnesey, 299 Pa. 97, 149 Atl. 103 (1930) ; Lummis
v. Crosby, 181 App. Div. 884, 162 N.Y. Supp. 44 (1916).
33. Since the fund for creditors was at that time insufficient to pay. them in full,
it would be manifestly unfair to permit retention of any of these assets by an im-
proper recipient. See Mitchell v. Jordan, 36 Wash. 645, 79 Pac. 311 (1905).
capital impaired the result cannot be accurately forecast. Some courts
require a restoration 4 This result stems from an application of the trust
fund doctrine, which conceives of capital stock as a reserve pool for the
benefit of creditors. On the other hand, some courts disregard that doc-
trine, and validate any payment even for a non-corporate purpose, made
while the corporation was solvent.35 The problem here is analogous to the
right of the creditors to recover dividends paid improperly out of capital,
inasmuch as the use of corporate property for personal purposes is, in effect,
the declaration of a dividend. It is submitted that the holdings of those
cases will govern the cases involving improper corporate disbursements,
in any particular state.30
When the obligation is still executory, at the time of the insolvency,
the courts will uniformly deny recovery to the obligee in an action against
a trustee or receiver, regardless of the condition of the company at the time
the obligation arose.37 This result has been accepted, without contention,
whenever the rights of prior creditors are involved.88 It would be unfair to
diminish the fund of assets in order to satisfy an improper obligation created
after credit had been extended. However, it has been urged that recovery
should not be denied when only subsequent creditors exist, i.e., creditors
whose claims came into existence after the improper obligation was executed.
The proponents of this theory plausibly contend that the subsequent credi-
tors relied only upon the financial condition at the time they extend credit.
This condition already reflected the allocation of corporate property to non-
corporate use. The argument has considerable merit when the obligation
was secured and the instrument was recorded. Nevertheless, no distinction
is made between prior and subsequent creditors.39 It still remains a fact
that the obligees have not contributed to the enhancement of the corporate
estate. Therefore, it is only fair that they should be denied the right to
share in its distribution unless no other creditors will be affected. In ad-
dition, a purely practical reason probably influences the result. The prob-
lem which would be created by separating prior from subsequent creditors,
might cause administrative difficulties which are not warranted in view of
the improper manner in which the obligation was created.
When corporate capital is impaired and the obligation is executory,
the right of an obligee of an improper corporate obligation to recover from
the corporation will depend upon whether or not the particular court accepts
34. Johnson v. Canfield-Swigart Co., 211 App. 423 (1918), aff'd, 292 Ill. 101,
126 N.E. 608 (1920).
35. Sweet v. Lang, 14 F.2d 758 (D. Minn. 1924).
36. See Notes, Actions Against Stockholders to Recover Illegal Dividends, 33
CoL. L. RZEv. 481 (1933); Shareholder's Respowsibility for Improper Dividends, 81
U. oF PA. L. Rav. 314 (1933).
37. In re Haas, 131 Fed. 232 (7th Cir. 1904).
38. Jackson v. Thomas Inv. Co., 46 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1931); Levine v. Sun
Drug Co., 65 Ohio App. 513, 30 N.E. 815 (1939).
39. Corley v. Cozart, 115 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1940) ; In re Haas, 131 Fed. 232
(7th Cir. 1904); In re Schultz Dry Goods Co., 236 Fed. 425 (W.D. Mo. 1916).
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the trust fund theory of capital. If the trust fund theory has been discarded,
payment will be compelled. 40  If the trust fund theorT prevails, payment
may be denied.
41
Generally it is difficult to formulate any strong arguments in favor of
the recipient of corporate property which has been distributed to him, un-
less creditors are completely unaffected. It must be remembered that, bona
fide creditors of the corporation cannot mhaintain a careful control of cor-
porate activities.
However, the cases fail to distinguish between obligees who are
cognizant of the improper application of funds and those who accept cor-
porate property in good faith.4 Most of the cases have involved people
who knew, or had reason to know, that the obligation was improper. It
would seem that good faith should be a distinguishing factor. For in-
stance, would it be fair to compel the restitution of sums paid for the rental
of a hotel ballroom, for an alleged corporate function, when instead a
private party was held. Although the bankruptcy acts and state insolvency
laws may control when the corporation was insolvent, it would be very
unfair to require restitution when the capital had been merely impaired
at the time for payment.
Personal Liability of Sole Stockholder.-No cases have been found
which discuss the possibility of imposing personal liability on a sole stock-
holder when improperly distributed corporate property is recovered, or
payment on an executory contract is denied. It would seem that recovery
in quasi-contract would be proper, unless the parties were considered to
be in pari delicto. This conclusion is unlikely, inasmuch as the contract
is not illegal. It might be equitable to allow a restitution recovery when
the obligee did not know or have reason to know that the sole stockholder
was acting improperly.
FACTORS LEADING TO PERSONAL LIABILITY
Manner of Operation of Business.-Mere failure to comply with
statutory formalities, such as holding directors meetings, will not subject
a sole shareholder to liability. Nevertheless in many situations the manner
in which he conducts his business will be important in determining per-
sonal liability. When the sole stockholder has represented himself to the
creditors "as the business", 43 or told creditors that "the corporation is a
mere name, but I really operate the store" 44 or other similar phrases, the
sole stockholder is personally held liable for the debts of the corporation.
40. Grand Rapids Fire Co. v. Ben Rose Tire Co., 264 Mich. 268, 249 N.W. 847
(1933).
41. Cf. O'Neill v. Finnessey, 299 Pa. 97, 149 Atl. 103 (1930).
42. But cf. Klepner Co. v. Hutton, 179 App. Div. 130, 166 N.Y. Supp. 468 (1917).
43. Tynes v. Shore, 117 W. Va. 355, 185 S.E. 845 (1936).
44. Rutz v. Obear, 15 Cal. App. 435, 115 Pac. 67 (1911).
A typical situation which will lead to personal liability is the failure
to maintain financial identity.45 When the disregard of corporate formali-
ties extends beyond the mere failure to hold meetings, elect directors, etc.,
and instead leads to financial commingling of the assets of the corporation
with those of the sole stockholder, the corporate separateness has been
destroyed by the stockholder himself. This may occur in several ways.
He may use corporate funds for personal purposes, he may use one bank
account for both the corporation and himself, or he may completely fail
to keep corporate books.46  The" problem is one of degree. If the com-
mingling has been nominal, and it is still possible to disentangle the in-
tertwined affairs without too much difficulty, then it would seem proper
to deny personal liability.. However, if the situation defies repair, espe-
cially when it is obvious that the improper actions have been so flagrant
as to be a direct cause of bankruptcy, then personal liability will be
imposed.
In most of the cases the sole stockholder has been held personally
liable when the corporation became insolvent. Should the creditor be
permitted to enforce an action against the sole stockholder, when the
latter has improperly destroyed the separate identity of person and cor-
poration, even when the corporation still exists and remains financially re-
sponsible? It would seem desirable to require the action against the
corporation. It would be senseless to waste the time of the court with
the presentation of evidence which proved the merging of identities, when
it is not necessary.47 However, an action for personal liability may be
warranted in the special instance where the creditor had no reason to
know he was dealing with a corporation. A new trial would unfairly
burden him with extra costs and a dismissal of his action would be com-
pletely fatal if the statute of limitations had run in the meantime against
the corporation.
Nevertheless, in certain cases personal liability is imposed upon the
sole stockholder, even though there is no indication of merger and the
corporation remains solvent.48 Apparently in these cases there is evidence
45. Great Oak Bld. Ass. v. Rosenheim, 341 Pa. 132, 19 A.2d 95 (1941); Quaid
v. Ratkowsky, 183 App. Div. 428, 170 N.Y. Supp. 812, (1918) aff'd, 224 N.Y. 624,
121 N.E. 887 (1918).
46. Cf. Baker v. Josephson, 137 N.J. Eq. 377, 44 A.2d 909 (1945); Sweet v.
Watson's Nursery, 30 Cal.App.2d 699, 92 P.2d 812 (1939).
47. Elenkreig v. Siebrecht, 238 N.Y. 254, 144 N.E. 519 (1924); cf. Berkey v.
Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926).
48. Harvey v. Hofman, 121 N.J. Eq. 523, 191 AtI. 756 (1937) (Defendant was
the sole stockholder of a solvent corporation, and also a director of the bankrupt cor-
poration. The bankrupt corporation had transferred some of its property to the
solvent corporation in fraud of creditors. Court held the defendant individually
liable for the amount of the property transferred since he was acting in dual position
of director of insolvent corporation and sole stockholder of the solvent corporation.
It would seem that defendant would not have been liable, personally, if he had oc-
cupied only one of the two positions, regardless of which one that was. Jackson v.
Kirschman, 175 So. 105 (La. App. 1937)) Plaintiff purchased a radio from the de-
fendant. Defendant transferred the contract to a corporation of which the defendant
was the sole stockholder. When only 50 remained due and unpaid, Corporation
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of reprehensible activity by the sole stockholder which justifies the result.
The activity may not have been illegal, but merely morally unjustifiable.
Although decision of any particular case may be warranted emotionally,
it evidently interposes a large degree of uncertainty which might be
undesirable. However, this line of cases may stand as a warning to sole
stockholders, and as a worthwhile deterrent.
Even though the failure to comply with corporate requirements would
not cause personal liability to creditors, in some special situations any de-
viation from full compliance with corporate formalities may lead to a de-
struction of the corporate entity for a particular purpose. If some other
interest merits greater consideration it may of its own force be strong
enough to pierce the corporate veil. An excellent example is the case of
Tellis v. Tellis.49 Here a husband who had been separated from his wife
for many years opened a business in corporate form. He failed to hold direc-
tors meetings, etc., and also neglected to maintain strict financial distinction.
Nevertheless it is doubtful if a court would have imposed on him personal
liability to creditors. In an action by the wife to enforce dower rights, the
court specifically found that the creation of the corporation had not been for
the purpose of depriving the wife of dower, yet found an "equitable fraud"
and decreed that she possessed an inchoate right of. dower. The case has
recently been followed in New Jersey where the corporation and busi-
ness had been created even before the parties were married.50 The cases
cannot be supported unless it is assumed that the right of dower must
be enforced at all costs.
The results of the cases are interesting in those situations in which
the personal liability of the sole stockholder is not involved. What effect
will the manner of operation have in the following instances? B owned
a farmhouse on which he had an insurance policy. He incorporated the
farm, but failed to obtain the insurance company's approval of an assign-
ment. The farm burned. The court held that the farmer could not re-
cover.51 C sold his business good will to C corporation which C com-
pletely owned. Four years later C corporation sold its business and good
will to X. Two years later C reentered the same business. X asked the
court to enjoin C who claimed that he had sold the personal good will
six years before, and that there was sufficient time for the corporation to
acquire its own trade. The injunction was granted.52  D corporation,
which was solely owned by D, performed construction work for which it
was not paid. D filed a mechanics lien on the property within the four
improperly and illegally attached personal property belonging to the Plaintiff. In-
stead of suing the corporation, Plaintiff directed his attack against defendant indi-
vidually. There was absolutely no evidence of a failure to maintain strict financial
identity. Without any explanation the court held that the defendant was individually
liable in damages.
49. 132 N.J. Eq. 25, 26 A.2d 249 (1942).
50. Frank v. Franks, 83 A.2d 33 (N.J. Eq. 1951).
51. White v. Evans, 117 N.J. Eq. 1, 174 Atl. 731 (1934).
52. Cooper v. Anchor Sec., 9 Wash. 2d 45, 113 P.2d 845 (1941).
month period required by statute. After the statutory period, the cor-
poration moved to amend to include the name of D corporation. The
court held that the attempt came too late, and denied recovery to D or
D corporation. 53 It is apparent that the control, lack of control, failure to
comply with, or rigid adherence to corporate formalities, appropriating or
failure to appropriate corporate property for personal purposes, or strict
financial separation or complete financial merger made no difference in the
above cases. 4
Inadequate Capitalization.--Personal iability may be imposed upon a
sole stockholder when he has established a corporation with inadequate
capital. 5 The courts have refused to permit a person to obtain the bene-
fits of limited liability unless that person has honestly risked an adequate
amount of money. A sole stockholder must be willing to endure the
hazards of business and should not be permitted to shift the burden to
his creditors. At the same time, it is granted that he may be permitted
to risk only a part of his own personal fortune, for otherwise, the aspect of
limited liability will be meaningless. In other words, there is an attain-
able happy medium. Most of the problems in this field have arisen from
parent subsidiary relationships, but those cases there are quite helpful in
solving the same problems in the one man corporation situation.5 6
For the purpose of this section, the cases can be divided into three
classes, tort claims, claims of dependent creditors, and claims of creditors
who have engaged in arms-length transactions with the corporation. When
the plaintiff has a tort claim against the corporation, the courts are almost
unanimous in granting recovery whenever it is decided that the corpora-
53. Garrett v. Downing, 185 Okla. 77, 90 P.2d 636 (1939).
54. See also Irving Investment Co. v. Gordon, 3 NJ. 217, 69 A.2d 726 (1949);
Weed Arch Inc. v. Horning, 33 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1948) ; Sanitary and Septic Package
Co., 205 S.C. 198, 31 S.E.2d 253 (1944).
55. Shea v. Leonis, 14 Cal.2d 666, 96 P.2d 332 (1939). Mosher v. Salt River
Valley Water User's Ass'n, 39 Ariz. 567, 8 P.2d 1077 (1932) ; Dixie Coal Min. v.
Williams, 221 Ala. 331, 128 So. 799 (1930).
56. To illustrate a situation of inadequate capitalization, consider the case of
Eriksont v. Minwsota and On ario Power Co., 134 Minn. 209, 158 N.W. 979 (1916),
which involves a parent-subsidiary relationship. Nevertheless the principles are ap-
plicable to one-man corporations. In order to obtain immunity from damage suits, a
parent corporation was to construct a dam, created a subsidiary corporation with
negligible capital. The subsidiary constructed, owned and operated the dam, building
the dam with money advanced by the parent corporation, in return for which the
parent took a mortgage on the dam. The parent paid to the subsidiary $4000.00
annually for maintenance. The parent reserved the exclusive use of all water passing
over the dam, rent free. In other words, the subsidiary which had a trivial capitali-"
zation was unable to accumulate any funds whatsoever. When the dam overflowed
and damaged the plaintiff's land, he was permitted to recover against the parent cor-
poration.. Another example would be a sole stockholder who wished to operate a
taxi-cab business, but avoid liability for injuries. He would create the corporation
with a minimum capital, and then lease taxi-cabs to the corporation, retaining per-
sonal ownership of all the property. The corporation might have nothing more than
a franchise. A person injured by taxi-cab should have an action against the sole
stockholder. Cf. Staacke v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 994 (1922), where
the court on similar facts refused to impose liability on sole stockholder. However,
it appears that the issue of inadequate capitalization was never raised. The main is-
sue in the case was "ultra vires."
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tion was inadequately capitalized. 57 However, when the plaintiff has had
business dealings with the corporation a factor of estoppel may appear.
It has been claimed that if the person had knowledge of the inadequate
capitalization, or could have easily learned the facts, he is deemed to have
relied upon the credit of the corporation alone, and cannot hold the sole
stockholder responsible.5 8 This argument may have meaning when the
plaintiff is an individual or a corporation which would ordinarily investi-
gate prospective debtors meticulously, and who could properly and fully
protect themselves.5 9 It has been said that if they are hesitant about ex-
tending credit, they can always demand that the sole stockholder or parent
guarantee the debts. Unfortunately this argument may be somewhat un-
realistic. At the same time the contract was made, the debtor corporation
might have been in a period of prosperity and have been successfully en-
gaged in business for years. People dealing with it should be allowed to
rely on its glow or prosperity. It is only when bad times occur, and the
corporation becomes unable to weather the storm that the law suits begin.
It is submitted that the creditor should always prevail, unless it was ap-
parent at the time the contract was drawn tfiat the corporation was shaky,
and that the creditor was entering into an obviously hazardous contract.60
57. Mosher v. Salt River Valley Water User's Ass., 39 Ariz. 567, 8 P.2d 1077
(1932) ; Dixie Coal Min. v. Williams, 221 Ala. 331, 128 So. 799 (1930); Chesapeake
Stone Co. v. Holbrook, 168 Kv. 128, 181 S.W. 953 (1916) ; cf. Buckner v. Dillard,
184 Okla. 586, 89 P.2d 326 (1939) ; A coal Co. was in receivership. Receivers con-
tracted with C to run mine. C wished to avoid personal liability and formed D
Corp. of which he was the sole stockholder. D Corp. hired a partnership to operate
the mine. P was injured and could not recover from the partnership which was in-
solvent. Under Oklahoma law, an injured employee has an action against principal
employer who failed to require independent contractor to comply with Workmen's
Compensation Laws. Court held that D Corp. was principal employer, not C. In
the past D Corp. had maintained a reserve for injuries to workmen, which fund was
now depleted. The court refused to impose liability on C personally, probably in
view of the past payments. There is no discussion in the case of the amount of
capitalization, or any reference to methods used in the past to create and maintain
a fund for injured employees.
58. Westervelts Sons v. Regency, Inc. 63 A.2d 818 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1948)
aff'd, 3 N.J. Super. 173, 65 A.2d 776 (1949).
59. Cf. Walker v. Wilkinson, 3 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1925); Fourth National
Bank v. Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refin. Corp., 284 Fed. 718 (5th Cir. 1922).
60. Parent corporation was held liable in Fourth National Bank v. Portsmouth
Cotton Oil Refin. Co., 284 Fed. 718 (5th Cir. 1922); Luckenback S.S. Co. "%. Grace
& Co., 257 Fed. 676 (4th Cir. 1920). The principle was recognized in Carlesimo
v. Schwabel, 99 Cal.App.2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948), although judgment was given
to the defendant because Plaintiff had not sustained burden of proof. Corporation
was formed with $1,000.00 capital. Plaintiff had brought a breach of contract ac-
"tion for $17,000. Cf. Whitney v. Leighton, 255 Minn. 1, 30 N.W. 329 (1947), where
a transfer of a lease was made by an assignee of the lease to a one man corporation
owned solely by assignee. Under the Minnesota law an assignee of a lease is only
liable for payments under lease while in possession and he can eradicate further lia-
bility by transferring the lease to anyone including a beggar. As a result the assignee
was not liable for payment of rent after transfer to a one man corporation; contra,
National Bank v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938), sole stockholder held
liable inasmuch as he actually continued to receive benefits of lease. In neither case
did the court discuss the financial status of the one man corporation. In Shea v.
Leonis, 14 Cal.2d 666, 96 P.2d 332 (1939) the corporation which was formed to accept
assignment was inadequately capitalized and the liability of the sole stockholder was
placed on that ground.
A fortiori, recovery should never be denied an employee of an inade-
quately capitalized corporation, or one who has done incidental work for
it, such as repairs. It is fatuous to expect such people to examine the
corporate balance sheet and to delve into corporate finance. Nevertheless,
in a recent Massachusetts case, the court held that a hotel manager could
not recover from the sole stockholders of a hotel corporation which had
a capital of $500.00 and debts owed to the two main stockholders of
$270,000.00. °1 The court believed that the manager had adequate notice
of the financial arrangement and had implicitly agreed to look only to the
corporation for remuneration.
What is adequate capital? It is impossible to establish any standard
amount. The type of business, its locality, its gross business are all factors
which will be relevant. In determining whether or not a corporation was
inadequately capitalized, the court should set a figure which would be
the fair amount necessary to initiate the enterprise. If the sole stock-
holder has risked a substantial amount at the inception of the corporation,
there should be no objection to future financial aid by the sole stockholder
which is not intended to be incorporated into the capital. An excellent
example of this theory is the recent case of Arnold v. Phillips.62 Arnold
wished to engage in the brewery business. He formed a corporation with
a capital stock of $50,000.00 paying for the stock with cash. He then loaned
the corporation $75,000.00 so that the corporation would have enough
money to commence operations. The business began to lose heavily, and
Arnold loaned it large amounts of money. The court held that the first
loan of $75,000.00 was capital since the money was necessary in order to
enable the corporation to commence operations and as a result it could not
be recovered by the sole stockholder. However, the money advanced sub-
sequently was recognized as a bona fide loan.
Express Assumption of Liability or Guarantee by the Sole Stockholder.
-If the sole stockholder personally agreed in writing to pay a corporate
obligation, then no problem exists. There is no reason why a sole stock-
holder cannot contract for his company with the company in the position
of a co-obligor.6 Unfortunately statements made are generally oral and
of an equivocal nature, and it is difficult to interpret the intention of the
sole stockholder. For instance, what is intended by a statement such as
"I'll see that you are paid." 64 Did the sole stockholder intend to be bound
as a co-obligor, or did he intend to guarantee the obligation? This will
essentially be a problem of proof. When the sole stockholder intended a
guarantee should his oral statement be unenforceable by virtue of the
statute of frauds which applies to agreements to answer for the debt, de-
61. Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d 259 (1937).
62. 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941).
63. Geller v. Tow, 261 App. Div. 773, 27 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1941) ; cf. S. J. Cordner
Co. v. Maevitz, 92 Conn. 587, 103 Atl. 842 (1918).
64. Mills v. Miller, 64 S.E.2d 11 (W. Va. 1951).
1952] NOTES
864 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100
fault, or miscarriage of another? This presents a conceptual problem. It
can be said that in reality, the corporation in the same as the individual,
or should be for this purpose, and therefore, the statute should not be
applicable inasmuch as the person would only be reaffirming his own debt.65
On the other hand it appears to be very important to apply the statute.
Due to the close relationship of the stockholder and his corporation, it
would be very simple for a creditor to allege an oral guarantee. The cases
which have handled the problem agree that the statute of frauds is funda-
mentally applicable. 66 Nevertheless, in some situations it does not govern.
If the promise is considered to be original, instead of collateral, then the
promise is binding. 7 Apparently, by original, the courts do not mean
that the promise must have been given at the inception of the original
debt.68 Early cases apparently devised a sensible distinction. If the guar-
antee secured for the stockholder some additional tangible consideration,
the guarantee was original. 69 If instead, the only benefit accruing to the
sole stockholder was through the medium of the stock ownership, and
was therefore indirect, then the promise was collateral.70 Nevertheless,
recent cases have tended to obliterate the distinction without suggesting
an alternative test.7-1 In many cases a stockholder has been held liable
when the only benefit was through the medium of stock ownership.72
Due to the nature of one man corporations, it is unlikely that many
situations would occur in which the guarantee would operate to give the
sole stockholder a new, tangible substantial consideration. Nevertheless,
it is a possibility. If the policy of the statute of frauds is to be maintained,
it is essential that close scrutiny accompany claims of oral guarantee.
Since the possibility of fabrication is great, all claims should be excluded
unless additional benefit can be shown. The latter would be enough to
prove the reliability of the claim.
CLAIMS OF A SOLE STOCKHOLDER AGAINST His OWN CORPORATION
These claims may arise in either of two situations. A sole stockholder
who has sold his stock to other interests now claims that the corporation
65. Cf. Sadd v. Siegelbaum, 124 Conn. 383, 200 A.2d 346 (1938).
66. Hoffer v. Eastland National Bank, 169 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);
Quaid v. Ratkowsky, 183 App. Div. 428, 170 N.Y. Supp. 812, aff'd, 224 N.Y. 624,
121 N.E. 887 (1918) ; Hiart Hardware Co. v. Goodman, 68 W.Va. 462, 69 S.E. 898
(1910).
67. Tynes v. Shore, 117 W. Va. 355, 185 S.E. 845 (1936) ; S.J. Cordner Co. v.
Maevetz, 92 Conn. 587, 103 Atl. 842 (1918) ; Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N.Y.
497, 121 N.E. 362 (1918).
68. Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 129 P.2d 390 (1942); Tynes v. Shore, 117
W. Va. 355, 185 S.E. 845 (1936).
69. Cf. Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479 (1891) ; Emerson v. Slater, 22 How. 28
(U.S. 1859). See 2 WILLIsToN, CoNTRACrs § 448-484 (1936).
70. Hirst Hardware Co. v. Goodman, 68 W. Va. 462, 59 S.E. 898 (1910);
Turner v. Lyles, 68 S.C. 391, 48 S.E. 300 (1904) ; cf. Union Properties v. Bogdanoff,
250 App. Div. 282, 284 N.Y. Supp. 151 (1936).
71. Tynes v. Shore, 117 W. Va. 355, 185 S.E. 845 (1936).
72. Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 129 P.2d 390 (1942); American Wholesale
Corp. v. Mauldin, 128 S.C. 241, 122 S.E. 576 (1924).
is indebted to him,73 or the corporation becomes insolvent and the sole
stockholder seeks to share in the distribution of the remaining assets.74
When the corporation has been sold to other interests, and a claim is
made, the former sole stockholder will recover where the claim was prop-
erly present on the books at the time of the sale.75 If the parties had agreed
that the sole stockholder was not to recover any debts from the corpora-
tion, then recovery will be denied.76 If the books failed to indicate any
corporate obligations to the sole stockholder, recovery will also be denied.
77
The problems created by insolvency are more complex. The cases
can be divided into two classifications. Where the sole stockholder ade-
quately capitalized the corporation and kept financial records, he will be
allowed to share in the proceeds.78  If the financial identities of the two
parties were merged so that it is impossible to determine accurately if the
sole stockholder is really a creditor, then his claim will be denied.79 It is
obvious that there is a real danger of simulated claims. If the corpora-
tion was inadequately capitalized, recovery will probably be denied.
It will be necessary to determine whether the capitalization was suffi-
cient. The solution adopted by the federal court in Arnold v. Phillips 80
is eminently sensible. It suggested that a sole stockholder should be per-
mitted to lend his corporation an amount equivalent to the capital stock
value. However, it is impossible to make an arbitrary ruling. The rules
of fair play should govern. The sole stockholder should be required to
invest a respectable sum without risking his own personal fortune. Each
case must be decided on its own merits.
MISCELLANEOUS
Many cases can be decided only by an application of equitable prin-
ciples. If the recognition of the corporate entity would cause an unjust
result, it should be disregarded. For example, compare two cases which
came before the California Supreme Court in 1921. In Erkenbracher v.
Grant 81 C and D were joint guarantors on a promissory note. The payee
73. Paul v. University Motors, 283 Mich. 587, 278 N.W. 714 (1938); Kniese
v. Fairfax Incline R. Co., 96 Cal. App. 427, 274 Pac. 382 (1929).
74. Wheeler v. Smith, 30 F.2d (9th Cir. 1929) ; Albert Richards Co. v. Mayfair,
287 Mass. 280, 19 N.E. 430 (1934) ; Salomon v. Salomon [1897] A.C. 22.
75. Kniese v. Fairfax Incline R. Co., 96 Cal. App. 427, 274 Pac. 382 (1929).
76. Paul v. University Motors, 283 Mich. 587, 278 N.W. 714 (1938).
77. Times-Republican Printing Co. v. Given (C.C.S.D. Iowa, 1900).
78. Wheeler v. Smith, 30 F.2d (9th Cir. 1929); Garnder v. Rutherford, 57
Cal.App.2d 874, 136 P.2d 48 (1943) ; Vennerbreck and Clune Co. v. Juergens Jewelry
Co., 53 R.I. 135, 164 Atl. 509 (1933); H. E. Griggs and Co. v. Harpers Clay
Products Co., 150 Wash. 235, 272 Pac. 962 (1928).
79. it re Burntside Lodge, 7 F. Supp. 785 (D.C. Minn. 1934); cf. Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
80. 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941); cf. Westervelts Sons v. Regency, 63 A.2d
818 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1948), aff'd, 3 N.J. Super. 172, 65 A.2d 776 (1949) ; Carlesimon
v. Schwabel, 87 Cal.App.2d 484, 195 P.2d 167 (1948).
81. 187 Cal. 7, 200 Pac. 641 (1921).
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was pressing for payment, and the maker was unable to pay. The payee
threatened to enforce the guarantee. The note was purchased by D cor-
poration, which was solely owned by D. D corporation held the note for
four years, and then D paid the corporation. D then brought an action
for contribution against C, who contended that the statute of limitations
barred recovery. C claimed that the statute began to run from the mo-
ment D corporation bought the note. The court held that the corpora-
tion was a separate and distinct identity, and therefore permitted D
to recover.
In Minifie v. Rowley,82 G was the sole stockholder of G corporation,
which was the maker of a note payable to L. L died and G became a co-
executor of L's estate. The statute of limitations ran on the corporate
note. Nevertheless, for this purpose the note was held to be an obligation
of the individual, and since an executor under the California law was
indefinitely liable, G was required to pay. Thus, in two cases the court
found a method of avoiding the statute of limitations, although in one case
the separate identity was recognized, and in the other case it was dis-
regarded.
Equitable principles apply when a person incorporates his business and
applies for a continuation of the same merit rating for state unemploy-
ment compensation insurance.8 3 It would be unfair to deny the sole
stockholder the benefit of his past record, merely because the business was
now being operated in the corporate form. At the same time, the individual
who subdivides his business into several corporations in order to evade
workmen's compensation taxes will not be successful.8 4 It is apparent that
each case is being decided on its own particular facts. The only standard
is a just and equitable result.8 5  It is impossible to formulate a more
definite test.
CONCLUSION
The cases have shown that the one man corporation is valid, provided
that in its inception and operation proper safeguards are maintained and
fair dealing with third parties exists. The courts have thereby sanctioned
82. 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921).
83. Packard v. Director, 318 Mass. 329, 61 N.E.2d (1945).
84. Workmen's Compensation taxes generally do not have to be paid unless
four men are employed. See New Haven Metal v. Hanaher, 128 Conn. 213, 21 A.2d
383 (1941) , However, when the person is the sole stockholder of two or more cor-
porations which are totally unrelated, the identity will not be disregarded. Unem-
ployment Comp. B. v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 36 A.2d 666 (1944); Indep. Gas Co.
v. Bureau, 190 Ga. 613, 10 S.E.2d 58 (1940).
85. This statement applies to all situations where the sole stockholder has
formed a corporation or is using a corporation for fraudulent purposes. See Pickling
Prop. v. Smith, 123 Fla. 556, 167 So. 42 (1936) (breach of fiduciary duty through
use of corporation) ; 215 Minn. 123, 9 N.W.2d 416 (1943) (Corp. violating liquor
law); P.U.C. v. Cirse, 240 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. 1951) (Person ordered to cease and
desist selling electrical energy formed corporation to continue business. Held, cor-
poration could be enjoined without a new hearing.) See also, In. re Clarke's Will,
284 N.W. 876, 204 Minn. 574 (1939).
a device which remains unrecognized by the statutory law.86 In the future
development of this field three choices remain open to the legislatures.
They may either retain the present statutes and continue to permit judicial
recognition, they may grant limited liability to sole proprietorships, or they
may recognize the one man corporation. It is suggested that the last
method be followed.
It would not be feasible to allow sole proprietorships the benefits of
limited liability. It is absolutely necessary that some standard be main-
tained, by which a creditor will be cognizant of the capital of the business.
Under the present set-up, a single person can organize a corporation
(with the aid of two dummy incorporators, and two dummy directors)
with a minimum of effort and expense, and thereafter operate his busi-
ness without directors or shareholders meetings and any other corporate
formalities, as long as separate books and records are kept for the cor-
poration. Why even require this effort? Because, it informs creditors of
the nature of the business, of its capital, and the extent to which it will
be liable for its debts. If limited liability were permitted for sole proprietor-
ships, a creditor would have no standard by which he would be able to
investigate the reliability of the corporation. It would still be necessary
to require the sole proprietor to state a sum of money which would be
irrevocably devoted to the needs of the business. If such a formality is
still necessary, he might as well be required to incorporate. Then in addi-
tion, if the law gives the privilege of limited liability to sole proprietorships,
it must make the same allowance for partnerships. Here there would be
an inextricable problem. It would be completely impossible to establish
any standard for the partnership. In summary, it would be a completely
inadvisable method.
Therefore, there seems to be no doubt that the -orporate method is
preferable, provided that it is just and desirable that a sole proprietor be
permitted to avail himself of benefits of incorporating. It is believed that
the most important aspect of incorporation is limited liability. It is entirely
just and appropriate that single individuals have the right to incorporate
their businesses to obtain this advantage. It is obvious that business of
the country is gradually being concentrated into fewer and fewer corpora-
tions. The plight of the small businessman has been recognized and at-
tempts made to reinforce his position in the economy. Certainly it should
be desirable to grant him the privilege of incorporation in order to com-
pete with larger corporations. People would naturally be deterred from
risking their available capital into business enterprises, if they knew that
their entire fortune was susceptible to loss. However, if only a portion
can be invested, with risk limited to that amount, then investment is en-
couraged. This should be permitted provided that the individual invests
a reasonable and fair amount into the business.87  In the second place, a
86. Sup-ra note 3.
87. Supra note 56.
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businessman who is interested in expanding his business may obtain tax
benefits by incorporating. A sole proprietor must pay individual income
taxes on his entire profit for the year. Therefore, regardless of the amount
of money withdrawn or left in the business, the same tax is paid. How-
ever, if an individual is interested in expansion, he can incorporate, pay
himself a modest salary and allow a substantial portion of the profits to be
taxed only at corporate rates. Unfortunately, the recent severe increase
in corporation taxation from 37% to 52% makes this plan inadvisable un-
less his yearly net income is quite large.
Inasmuch as the one man corporation can be justified on economic
and social grounds, and since it has been recognized by the courts for
over half a century, it would seem inadvisable that the legislatures of the
several states follow the lead of Michigan and Iowa and permit one man
to form a corporation and eliminate the board of directors. This would
simplify the entire problem and dissolve the aura of disrespectability and
uncertainty which still hovers over the one man corporation.
Jules Silk
OPERATION OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN
PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL CASES
Though appellate review in criminal cases is not a part of procedural
due process guaranteed by the 14th Amendment,1 every state in the union
has a system of appellate review.2 The criminal appeal has been conceived
to be necessary as a means of guaranteeing a fair trial to every accused
criminal, maintaining consistent standards in the criminal courts, and
developing the criminal law of the jurisdiction.3 Where life and liberty
are at stake, it is important that the appeal machinery function in a manner
which will achieve these ends. It is the purpose of this note to examine the
operation of criminal appeals in Pennsylvania to see whether the system
is geared to meet the demands of effective appellate review.
The history of the criminal appeal in Pennsylvania would seem to
indicate that it has been the "step child" in the appeal process, with the more
favored position accorded the civil appeal. Initially appeal by way of a writ
1. "An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter, of absolute right,
independently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such appeal."
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
Justice Holmes in denying a writ of habeas corpus to Sacco and Vanzetti ob-
served that if a state "had provided that a trial before a single judge should be
final, without appeal, it would have been consistent with the Constitution of the
United States." Sacco and Vanzetti v. Massachusetts, Memorandum of Justice
Holmes August 20, 1927, cited in MICHAEL AND WECHSLEP, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS ADMINISTRATION 1231 (1940).
2. Two jurisdictions, Texas and Oklahoma have separate courts to handle crimi-
nal appeals. See Carter, The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 11 Thx. L. REv.
1,185,301,455 (1932-33), and Edwards, The Criminal Court of Appeals, Its History
and Functions, 24 REP. OKLA. BAR 34 (1930).
3. Professor Orfield sets these three objectives out as the functions which the
criminal appeal serves in our system of criminal justice. ORFIFLD, CRIMINAL APPEALS
IN AmERICA 32-34 (1939).
of error did not apply to criminal cases.4 The power to examine the record
was extended in 1722 ' but did not give a "right" to appeal, since the writ
of error was issued as a matter of judicial grace,6 and was severely limited
in the scope of questions which might be reviewed.7 The first breach in
the wall of judicial discretion came when appeals in felonious homicides
were made as of right to the Supreme Court in 1870.8 Appeal in other
classes of criminal cases was permitted by writ of error from 1860,9 but
appeal was not of right till the creation of the Superior Court in 1895.10
From 1897 to the present, appeal in all classes 'of criminal cases to the
Superior Court has been of right.' 1 Felonious homicides are appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.12 While in most cases, a convicted criminal
is allowed only a one level appeal to the Superior Court, he may secure
further review of his case by the Supreme Court under certain circum-
stances. Because of the overriding importance of this system of appeals
from the Superior Court, it will be examined first.
APPEALS FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT TO THE SUPREME COURT
Appeals from the Superior to the Supreme Court are of two types.
There are those in which consideration of the questions involved is said
to be imperative and appeal must be allowed.'8 This type includes cases
where the jurisdiction of the Superior Court is in issue, the case involves
construction of the United States Constitution or a statute or treaty of the
United States, or the case involves construction of the Pennsylvania con-
stitution.' 4 A second class of cases exists in which appeal can be secured
only if the appeal is specially allowed by the Superior Court itself or any
one justice of the Supreme Court.15 These appeals are called "special
4. Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. 9, 13 (1865).
5. Act of May 22, 1722, 1 Sm. L. 131, § 9, now PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1091
(Purdon, 1931).
6. Turk v. Ashe, 167 Pa. Super. 323, 325, 74 A.2d 656, 657 (1950).
7. Id. at 326.
8. Act of February 16, 1870, P.L. 15, now PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1186
(Purdon 1930), incorporated in PA. CoNsT. Art. V, § 24, providing, "In all cases
of felonious homicide and in such other criminal cases, as may be provided for by
law, the accused after conviction and sentence may remove the indictment, record and
all proceedings to the Supreme Court for review."
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1181-1182 (Purdon, 1930).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 111 (Purdon, 1930).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, f§ 181-183 (Purdon, 1930).
12. One limitation on the right to appeal, is that the convicted criminal defend-
ant may appeal only from a final judgment. Commonwealth v. Gates, 98 Pa. Super.
591, 594 (1930). Thus there is no such thing as an interlocutory appeal for a criminal
defendant in Pennsylvania. This is to be contrasted with the position of the Com-
monwealth, for the large bulk of appeals which may be prosecuted by the Common-
wealth are interlocutory in nature. Where a defendant has been acquitted after trial
the Commonwealth may appeal only in cases of nuisance, forcible entry and detainer.
Commonwealth v. Tillia, 73 Pa. Super. 376 (1920). Generally the Commonwealth
is permitted an appeal at some time in the course of the trial where the defendant has
been discharged and a pure question of law remains, as where defendant has been
acquitted on a demurrer to the evidence, Commonwealth v. Kolsky, 100 Pa. Super.
596 (1930), or where the indictment has been quashed or judgment arrested. Com-
monwealth v. Carlucci, 48 Pa. Super. 72 (1911).
13. Commonwealth v. Caufield, 211 Pa. 644, 61 Atl. 243 (1905).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 190 (Purdon, 1930).
15. Ibid.
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appeals." 16 The Supreme Court has full discretion to allow or disallow
such appeals.
In any event, all appeals are prosecuted by the same procedure. A
petition for allowance of appeal is filed with the prothonotary of the Su-
preme Court and opposing counsel is notified of such action. If the appeal
is allowed, the prothonotary notifies all parties concerned. 17 This is known
as allowance of allocatur. If the Court denies the appeal, it need not specify
its grounds for refusal.' 8
16. Kraemer v. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 173 Pa. 416, 33 At. 1047
(1896).
17. PA. SUPREME CT. RULE 67.
18. The writer studied the allowance of allocatur in the cases reported from
volume 151 of the Pennsylvania Superior Court reports to date. This covered a period
from 1943 to 1951. The following two tables reflect the results of these studies.
TABLE I
ALLOCATUR IN CIVIL CASES
Volume of Pa. Allocatur Allowed Allocatur Allowed
Super. Ct. Allocatur Decision of Pa. Decision of Pa.
Reports Refused Super. Ct. affirmed Super. Ct. Reversed
151 22 2 0
152 27 2 2
153 17 3 0
154 20 3 5
155 18 3 3
156 22 2 2
157 27 7 1
158 21 4 4
159 27 4 2
160 23 2 2
161 21 2 2
162 28 3 0
163 16 5 1
164 22 1 0
165 12 2 1
166 25 1 1
167 13 0 1
Totals 361 46 27
TABLE II
ALLOcATUR IN CRIMINAL CASES
Volume of Pa. Allocatur allowed Allocatur allowed
Super. Ct. Allocatur Decision of Pa. Decision of Pa.
Reports Refused Super. Ct. Affirmed Super. Ct. Reversed
151 4 0 1
152 1 1 0
153 1 1 0
154 5 1 1
155 5 0 0
156 4 1 2
157 7 0 0
158 4 0 2
159 4 0 0
160 1 1 0
161 4 0 0
162 4 0 2
163 4 0 1
164 4 0 0
165 3 3 1
166 9 0 0
167 10 0 0
Totals 74 8 10
Granting of allocatur where the questions involved make consideration
of the appeal inandatory.-The consideration of constitutional and juris-
dictional questions is said to be mandatory.' 9 This does not mean that an
appeal will be allowed in every case in which a petition for allowance is
presented based on constitutional grounds. A substantial constitutional
issue must be presented.20 The appeal must involve open and unsettled
questions.21 This phase of allocatur is similar to the function of an appeal
in the United States Supreme Court. Thus, in any case in which allocatur
is sought on a constitutional basis and refused, the court must have con-
sidered the grounds and found them either frivolous or so conclusively
settled as not to warrant appeal. That this is not the case is best illustrated
by the record of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the "right to counsel
cases."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently held that the state
constitutional provision according defendants the right to be heard by
counsel does not require the appointment of counsel in non-capital cases.22
By statute, only destitute dependents accused of murder have counsel as-
signed to them.2 While in the federal courts concepts of due process
embodied in the Fifth Amendment require appointment of counsel in non-
capital cases where for lack of money or other good reason, defendant is
unable to engage counsel,24 the United States Supreme Court has held that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not require appointment of counsel to
accused criminals in non-capital state criminal prosecutions, unless some
unusual disadvantage, prejudice or unfairness would otherwise result.25
In 1948 the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions enunciated more clearly
what elements would make denial of counsel in non-capital cases violative
of due process. 26 Significantly, four of these cases came from Pennsyl-
vania courts and three of them resulted in reversals. In one of these cases,
habeas corpus had been denied in the Pennsylvania Superior Court 2 and
allocatur refused in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.28 The other two
Thus, it can be seen that as far as allowance of allocatur is concerned, civil cases
have not been accorded a more favored position than criminal cases in the proportion
of appeals which have been allowed. For the period studied there were 434 petitions
for allocatur in civil cases and 92 petitions in criminal cases. Of these 73 were al-
lowed in civil cases-a percentage of 16.8%. 18 petitions were allowed in criminal
cases or a percentage of 19.5%.
19. Commonwealth v. Caulfield, 211 Pa. 644, 61 AtI. 243 (1905).
20. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 297 Pa. 498, 147 Atl. 527 (1929).
21. Boyle's Retail Liquor License, 109 Pa. 577, 42 AtI. 1025 (1899).
22. Withers v. Ashe, 350 Pa. 493, 39 A.2d 610 (1944); Commonwealth ex rel.
McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41, 24 A.2d 1 (1941).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §784 (Purdon, 1931).
24. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
25. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
26. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S.
437 (1948) ; Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806 (1948) ; Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736 (1948); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334
U.S. 672 (1948) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
27. Commonwealth ex rel. Uveges v. Ashe, 161 Pa. Super. 58, 53 A.2d 894
(1947).
28. 167 Pa. Super. xxvi (1950).
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cases involved refusal of habeas corpus on original proceedings in the
Supreme Court.
In Uveges v. Pennsylvania,29 a 17 year old boy had pleaded guilty
to four burglary indictments, receiving sentences totaling 20 to 40 years.
The court made no effort to explain the consequences of a guilty plea and
at no time advised the defendant of his right to counsel. In reversing, the
United States Supreme Court found that in view of the defendant's youth,
the complexity of the charges against him, his ignorance of his legal rights,
and the severity of his sentence, "due process" required that he be repre-
sented by counsel at trial.
In Townsend v. Burke,3 0 defendant after pleading guilty, was sentenced
from 10 to 20 years on two counts each of burglary and armed robbery.
The trial judge, in sentencing, made sarcastic comments as to defendant's
criminal record, which indicated that he was misinformed. The United
States Supreme Court found failure to appoint counsel prejudicial. It
reasoned that had defendant been provided with counsel, the Judge's atten-
tion might have been directed to the error and defendant's sentence might
not have been so severe.
In Gibbs v. Burke,3 1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied habeas
corpus in an original proceeding. Defendant, a man in his thirties, con-
ducted his own defense in a trial for larceny. Several glaring errors were
made in the admission of evidence and the judge committed error in his
charge to the jury by making reference to the defendant's past criminal
record. It was held that the defendant was denied a fair trial because of
lack of counsel. The presence of an attorney might have avoided the con-
sequences of the error on trial, which defendant couldn't cope with because
of his ignorance.
These cases illustrate the poor record of the Pennsylvania appellate
courts on the question of right to counsel in non-capital cases. If any state
appellate court in the country should be aware of due process procedural
requirements as regards the right to counsel, it should be the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court.
3 2
But a study of allocaturs allowed would not reflect this. Since the
recent United States Supreme Court decisions in this area, there has been
a flood of cases in the courts seeking habeas corpus on the grounds of denial
of counsel. Denials of habeas corpus by lower courts are rarely reversed
by the Superior Court.n Allowance of allocaturs by the Supreme Court
after the Superior Court has affirmed lower court denial is even rarer. The
only inference to be drawn from disallowance of allocatur is that the cases
do not present substantial constiutional questions or that the law is so
29. 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
30. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
31. 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
32. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the original proceedings in these
cases and awarding new trials. Commonwealth ex rel. Townsend v. Burke, 361 Pa.
35, 70 A.2d 479 (1949).
33. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Hice v. Ashe, 166 Pa. Super. 35, 70 A.2d 479
(1950).
settled as to make appeal superfluous. Otherwise the Court would have
to grant appeal, an important constitutional question having been raised.
It might be seriously doubted whether that is so in many of these cases.
A good example of this is the recent case of Commonwealth ex rel.
Palmer v. Ashe.3 4 A young boy with a record of confinement in mental
institutions was given a severe sentence of 10 to 30 years, after pleading
guilty to two counts of armed robbery. He did not have benefit of counsel,
either when he pleaded guilty or when he was sentenced. The proceedings
were of a complicated nature, which a person of defendant's limited mental
capacities would have difficulty understanding. The Superior Court sum-
marily disposed of defendant's appeal from a denial of habeas corpus, by
holding that defendant had not been prejudiced by lack of counsel. The
court failed to take cognizance of the factors which the United States Su-
preme Court had laid down as significant in this area, i.e., the youth of the
defendant, the complexity of the charges, his poor mental abilities, and the
severity of the sentence imposed.
This was a case which called for allowance of allocatur, but the
appeal was not allowed.3 5 As it is impossible to tell from bare refusal of
allocatur on what grounds the Court disallowed appeal, presumably the
principles involved were so settled as not to admit of dispute or the appeal
was frivolous. That such was not the case is apparent. The inevitable
conclusion is that in this area the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is exer-
cising a broad discretionary power. The ultimate consequence of such
a practice is that the criminal law of Pennsylvania in the field of procedural
due process is being evolved by the United States Supreme Court. 6 It is
suggested that this is the proper function of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. Furthermore, limitations on the number of cases the United States
Supreme Court can consider prevent it from granting certiorari in many
worthy cases.
The cases which the court takes involving constitutional questions are
those in which it is imperative that the issue be resolved, as where the con-
stitutionality of an important new statute is involved, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Flickinger,37 involving the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Cigarette
Tax act. One appeal involving the right to counsel 3 8 was allowed, but the
court dismissed the appeal on receipt of an affidavit from the trial judge,
that he had offered the defendant counsel on trial, but defendant had
refused his offer.3 9 The court also allowed an appeal in a case involving
the significant constitutional issue of permissible restriction of the use
of sound trucks, but made no new observations, adopting the opinion of the
34. 167 Pa. Super. 88, 74 A.2d 725 (1950).
35. 167 Pa. Super. xxv (1950).
36. Another area in which the United States Supreme Court has delineated the
procedural criminal law of Pennsylvania has been the field of the coerced confession.
See Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949), reversing Commonwealth v.
Turner, 358 Pa. 350, 58 A.2d 61 (1948).
37. 165 Pa. Super. 95, 67 A.2d 779 (1949), aff'd, 365 Pa. 59, 73 A.2d 652 (1950).
38. Commonwealth ex rel. Hovis v. Ashe, 165 Pa. Super. 30, 67 A.2d 770 (1949).
39. Commonwealth ex rel. Hovis v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 81, 70 A.2d 630 (1950).
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Superior Court by reference. 40 These are the only cases in which appeal
has been allowed on constitutional grounds.
The Superior Court has been permitted to make final determination
of other serious constitutional questions.41 In Commonwealth ex rel.
Master v. Baldi,42 several vexatious constitutional questions were raised
(abduction of defendant from one state to another without securing extradi-
tion; forced confessions) which the Superior Court disposed of unsatis-
factorily. For example, the court cites the dissenting opinion in Watts v.
Indiana to support its contention that the confessions in question were not
coerced. Allocatur was refused in this case and certiorari denied by the
United States Supreme Court. The inevitable conclusion is that in the area
of constitutional rights, allocatur is not serving the ends for which it was
designed as a means of disciplining the Superior Court or enunciating the
constitutional limitations on enforcement of the criminal law of Penn-
sylvania.
42
Basis for the granting of "special appeals".-One of the most difficult
questions in the whole appeal process is the basis for exercising discretionary
power in taking a case from a lower appellate court. One commentator has
suggested that in such a situation the highest appeal court should hand-
pick its cases, with the end in mind of helping to develop the criminal law
of the jurisdiction." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that it
will exercise its discretionary appeal only "in cases of peculiar gravity and
general importance, and when other considerations than the mere desire or
interest of the parties are involved." Such considerations include "the
bearing of the question on public interest or rights; the importance of the
decision as a precedent in litigation of frequent occurrence; diversity of
opinion in the courts and the consequent desirability of a final determina-
tion; and generally the preservation of uniformity in application of legal
principles." "
These sentiments are not reflected in the cases in which the Supreme
Court has allowed special appeals. For the period studied,45 there were
nineteen cases in which allocatur was allowed in criminal decisions from
the Superior Court. Of these, only three involved issues making appeal
mandatory,46 so that sixteen of the cases involved "special appeals". In
three of these cases, appeal was allowed to the Commonwealth and the
40. Commonwealth v. Geuss, 368 Pa. 290, 81 A.2d 553 (1951), affirming Com-
monwealth v. Geuss, 168 Pa. 22, 76 A.2d 500 (1951).
41. E.g., Commonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 669 (1950). See
text at note 79, infra.
42. 166 Pa. Super. 413, 72 A.2d 150 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1950).
43. ORFiELD, CRIIiNAL APPEALs in AmmtcA 53-4 (1939).
44. Kraemer v. Guarantee Trust and Safe Deposit Co., 173 Pa. 416, 33 Atl.
1047 (1896).
45. See note 38 supra.
46. Commonwealth v. Geuss, 368 Pa. 290, 81 A.2d 553 (1951) ; Commonwealth
ex rel. Hovis v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 81, 70 A.2d 630 (1950) ; Commonwealth v. Flickinger,
365 Pa. 59, 73 A.2d 652 (1950).
decision of the Superior Court reversed. 47  In one of these cases, Con-
vnnwealth v. Kline,4" the Court enunciated an important new doctrine,
holding evidence of previous indecent exposure admissible against the
defendant in a prosecution for incestuous statutory rape.49 It is of inter-
est, that this was the only case in the study in which allocatur was allowed
and a novel rule of law evolved. Four of the cases involved procedural
questions,50 two of which were reversed,51 and two affirmed without
opinion.52 Of the nine other cases involved, six were reversed,53 and
three affirmed.5 4 Of those cases in which reversals were granted, four
involved serious charges of sexual deliction. This is interesting since of
the nineteen appeals allowed, seven were concerned with crimes of a sexual
nature. Five of the convictions were reversed on the grounds that they
were against the weight of the evidence.5 5 In the other case, the Supreme
Court held that the Superior Court had erred in finding certain error to
be non-prejudicial.56
In exercising its discretion, the Court seems to be more interested
in remedying injustices which may have been committed by the Superior
Court than in evolving the criminal law of the jurisdiction. Such con-
siderations as uniformity of application of criminal law by the various
trial courts are necessarily left to the Superior Court, as it is in position
to resolve any differences between various trial courts. In civil appeals
the Supreme Court maintains uniformity in the trial courts since much
of its civil jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Superior Court.
Virtually all criminal appeals must be taken to the Superior Court first.
The special appeals allowed from the Superior Court involve more serious
47. Commonwealth ex rel. Holly v. Ashe, 368 Pa. 211, 82 A.2d 244 (1951);
Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Kline,
361 Pa. 434, 65 A.2d 348 (1949).
48. Ibid.
49. 98 U. oF PA. L. REv. 116 (1949).
50. Commonwealth v. McClain et McClusker, 363 Pa. 450, 70 A.2d 273 (1950);
Commonwealth ex rel. Michelotti v. Ashe, 359 Pa. 542, 59 A.2d 891 (1948) ; Com-
monwealth v. Chalfant, 352 Pa. 193, 42 A.2d 587 (1945); Commonwealth ex rel.
Oviedo v. Baldi, 347 Pa. 601, 33 A.2d 12 (1943).
51. Commonwealth v. McClain et McClusker, spra; Commonwealth ex rel.
Michellotti v. Ashe, msupra.
52. Commonwealth v. Chalfant, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Oviedo v. Baldi,
sup'ra.
53. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 355 Pa. 607, 58 A.2d 330 (1948) (rape) ; Com-
monwealth v. Dress, 354 Pa. 411, 47 A.2d 197 (1946) (sodomy) ; Commonwealth v.
Shrodes, 354 Pa. 70, 46 A.2d 483 (1946) (assault with intent to commit rape) ; Com-
monwealth v. Bausewine, 354 Pa. 35, 46 A.2d 491 (1946) (bribery); Common-
wealth ex rel. Bureau of Weights and Measures v. C. G. Heyd & Co., 352 Pa. 194,
42 A.2d 621 (1945) (short weight violation) ; Commonwealth v. Ellis, 349 Pa. 402,
37 A.2d 504 (1944) (burglary with intent to commit rape).
54. Commonwealth v. Billingsley, 357 Pa. 378, 54 A.2d 705 (1947) (suborna-
tion of perjury); Commonwealth v. DePetro, 350 Pa. 567, 39 A.2d 838 (1944)
(arson); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 349 Pa. 599, 37 A.2d 443 (1944) (robbery).
55. E.g., Commonwealth v. Dress, supra.
56. Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra (permitting prosecuting witness in a rape
prosecution to assume the position in which the rape was committed in the presence
of the jury).
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crimes. Where the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, it is not
done by way of a different application or interpretation of law, but rather
on such mixed questions of law and fact as the weight of evidence to
sustain conviction and prejudicial error. In most areas of criminal law,
the Superior Court states novel Pennsylvania criminal law. A few exam-
ples will illustrate this.
In Commonwealth v. Canilleri,5 7 defendant was convicted as a com-
mon gambler for violation of a statutory prohibition on maintaining gam-
bling devices.5 s It appeared that defendant stored slot machines in his
barn with the intention to dismantle them and sell them for junk, etc.
The court held that mere possession of gambling devices, irrespective of
intent to use them for gambling purposes, constituted an offense. The
question was a novel one for Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions are
split. The Supreme Court refused allocatur in this case.
In Commonwealth v. Statti,5 9 the Superior Court was presented with
a problem which has vexed many courts. In a rape prosecution, a blood
specimen was taken without consent from the defendant, for purpose of
showing that blood stains left on the victim's clothing matched the defend-
ant's. The court held that such compulsory blood taking did not violate
defendant's rights against self incrimination. Allocatur was refused in
this case, notwithstanding the novelty of the question and the perplexing
constitutional problems involved. 0°
Appraisal of allocatur.-As a practical matter, allocatur in operation
has not achieved the ends for which it wai designed. The legislature con-
sidered constitutional problems in the area of criminal procedure to be
so important as to warrant a mandatory allowance of the appeal. How-
ever, in this area the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has tended to exer-
cise a broad discretionary power. The ultimate consequences of such a
practice has been that the constitutional limitations on criminal procedure
in Pennsylvania have been left to the final determination of the Superior
Court. If a convicted criminal is fortunate, he may secure consideration of
the question by the United States Supreme Court, already overburdened
with consideration of constitutional questions in appeals from state ap-
pellate courts.'
In the field of "special appeals", the avowed purpose of the Supreme
Court in allowing appeal, has been to help mold the criminal law of the
jurisdiction. But, in practice the Court has generally allowed appeal only
where it has disagreed with the Superior Court on some factual basis.
The consequence of such practice has been that the Superior Court de-
velops the criminal law of Pennsylvania with respect to crimes other than
felonious homicides.
57. 166 Pa. Super. 1, 70 A.2d 669 (1949).
58. PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 18, § 4603 (Purdon, 1945).
59. 166 Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950).
60. 167 Pa. Super. xxvii (1950).
POWER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA APPELLATE COURTS TO REVIEW SENTENCE
The power of appellate courts to correct erroneous sentences is one
of the most perplexing questions to face appellate courts today.6 Errors
in sentences may be of two types. A sentence may be illegal because of
departure from the legal standard for sentencing, as where a sentence is
in excess of the statutory maximum specified for the crime. The power
of the appellate court to deal with such sentence is unquestioned today
and is generally exercised by remand to the trial court for purpose of
resentence, 2 or correction of the error itself by striking out some part of
the sentence.6 At one time, appellate courts in dealing with illegal sen-
tences could only reverse and grant a new trial, instead of partially re-
versing with respect to the sentence only."
A sentence may be legal, in that it falls within the legal bounds per-
missible, but erroneous insofar as it is excessive with respect to the par-
ticular case at hand. It is the question of appellate court control over
such sentences which raises the greatest difficulty today. Few states have
express statutory authority for appellate reduction of excessive sentences.P
Pennsylvania has no such provision, but it is provided that the appellate
courts may affirm, reverse, amend or modify a judgment or decree ap-
pealed from.66 Many states have similar provisions, but only a handful
of courts have interpreted them to authorize appellate reduction of ex-
cessive sentences. 67 Pennsylvania is one of these states.68
The extent to which such power will be exercised is uncertain, how-
ever, because of the dearth of case authority on the question. 9 In one class
of cases, it is clear that the power can be exercised. A sentence of death
will be reversed on appeal where such sentence is felt to be "unjust".70 In
non-capital cases, there is no direct authority for reduction of excessive
sentences. Where there is a statutory authorization for a maximum and
minimum sentence for a particular crime, then the decision of the trial
court is generally final. It is said to be something which is peculiarly in
the discretion of the trial judge,71 and as such will not be set aside unless
61. In general see Hall, Reduction of Crimibwl Sentenwes on Appeal, 37 Co.
L. REv. 521, 762 (1937).
62. Commonwealth v. Preston, 188 Pa. 429, 437 (1898).
63. Commonwealth v. Curry, 285 Pa. 289, 132 Atl. 370 (1926).
64. OaRIEL, CRIMINAL APPEALS IiN AmmicA 101-2 (1939).
65. E.g., IowA Comp. STAT. §29-2308 (1929).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1164 (Purdon, 1931); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 192 (Purdon, 1930).
67. E.g., Brown v. State, 34 Ark. 232 (1879).
68. Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733 (1932).
69. Hall, supra note 61, at 521.
70. Commonwealth v. Garramone, supra. However, in this case sentence was
fixed by the judge. The Court has not yet indicated whether the power to reduce sen-
tence extends to a death sentence fixed by a jury. Commonwealth v. Harris, 314 Pa.
81, 171 At. 279 (1934).
71. Commonwealth ex rel. Palmer v. Ashe, 167 Pa. Super. 88, 74 A.2d 725
(1950).
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an abuse of discretion is shown, the inference being that in this case the
court could reduce sentence. But it is rare that an abuse of discretion can
be shown.
Modem authorities 72 contend that appellate courts should use their
power to reduce sentences more liberally, inasmuch as it serves as a means
of alleviating unjust sentences and maintaining uniform sentence procedures
in the various trial courts.73 It might be pointed out that Pennsylvania
courts are in an excellent position to exercise a more intelligent review
of sentences than most states are. By court rules, on receipt of the
notice of appeal, the trial court must file with the appellate court "at least
a brief statement of the reasons for such . . . judgment in the form
of an opinion, . . ., 74 The appellate courts might well use such a state-
ment as a basis for review of the sentence. But, while the facilities and
power are there, the courts have made negligible use of them. This might
well be a field for increased appellate activity.
PROCEDURAL LImlTATIoNs ON THE SCOPE OF APPEAL
A criminal trial may result in hundreds of rulings by the trial judge.7
5
Because judges are human, it is not to be expected that their rulings will
be 100% accurate. As has been put by one judge, "Practically every
decision of a lower court can be reversed." 76 The appeal courts have
consequently developed several doctrines designed to discipline the con-
sideration of error by a trial court. First, the appeal court will consider
error, with certain significant exceptions, only if the errors are properly
preserved for their consideration.77 Second, an error on trial will serve
as a basis for reversal only where such error is substantial and preju-
dicial.
78
Exceptions.-The scope of appeal in Pennsylvania prior to 1860 was
very narrow, as a defendant in a criminal case had no right to a bill of
exceptions.7 9  Reversals could be had only for errors apparent on the
face of the record. The right to a formal common law bill of exceptions
72. E.g., CODE oF CPRmINA. PROCEDURE § 459(2) (1930), giving the court power
to reduce sentence ". . . when in their opinion the sentence is excessive" and to
"render such sentence against the accused as in their opinion may be warranted by
the evidence."
73. Hall, supra note 61 at 762-767.
74. PA. SuPaRim- CT. RuLE 43; PA. SuPsa. CT. Ruiu 43.
75. ULMAN, A JUDGE TAKES THE STAND 263-65 (1933).
76. Id. at 265.
77. In general, see Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider
Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved, 7 Wis. L. Rtv. 91 (1932); 8 Wis.
L. REv. 147 (1933).
78. In general, see Baker, Reversible Error in Homicide Cases, 23 J. CRIm. L.
& CR iNoLOGY 28 (1932).
79. Commonwealth ex rel. Turk v. Ashe, 167 Pa. Super. 323, 74 A.2d 656
(1950).
was extended to convicted criminals in the case of felonious homicides in
1860,80 and other classes of criminal cases in 1874.11 Requirement of a
formal bill of exceptions, whereby the exception was written out, signed
and sealed by the trial judge was eliminated in 1911. Now the court
stenographer notes the exception of counsel, without allowance by the
judge and it is preserved as part of the record.8 2 Counsel, in addition to
excepting to particular portions of the judge's charge, may also make a
general exception to the entire charge without necessity of specifying which
portions he finds objectionable.83
The taking of exceptions imposes the first limitation on the scope
of the case to be considered on appeal. Under the present state of the
law in Pennsylvania, the general doctrine is that the appellate court will
not consider a trial court ruling to which no exception was taken below.8 4
The reason for the rule has been said to enable the trial court to have the
first opportunity to correct any error which has appeared on trial. In-
deed, one experienced trial judge has indicated that a judge who might
be prone to disregard an objection will seriously reconsider his ruling
once his attention is called to it by an appropriate exception. Thus, it
would seem that a duty is imposed on diligent counsel to present all pos-
sible questions to the trial court in order to get a ruling on them and
preserve them by appropriate exception, if he is to serve the best inter-
ests of his client. He may find on appeal of the cause he has divested
his client of substantial rights through inandvertence.
The objectionable feature of limiting the scope of review by requiring
an exception on trial is apparent. The best interests of justice are not to
be served, especially in the area of criminal appeals, by precluding con-
sideration of a particular ruling on appeal on the technical grounds that
an exception was not taken on trial of the cause, where the prosecution
has not really been prejudiced by failure to take such exception.
It is doubtful whether the exception serves the purpose for which it
was designed. Where the court wishes to consider an error it can usually
find a way to do it, as is illustrated by the following doctrines which the
Pennsylvania courts have enunciated. The appeal court will not con-
sider error if not excepted to on trial unless such error is basic and funda-
mental error.8 6 Similarly, a general exception to the charge puts in issue
80. PA. STAT. A N. tit. 19, §§ 1182-3 (Purdon, 1930).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1188 (Purdon, 1930).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1196 (Purdon, 1931).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1197 (Purdon, 1931).
84. Commonwealth v. Winegrad, 119 Pa. Super. 78, 180 At. 160 (1935); Com-
monwealth v. Russell, 117 Pa. Super. 359, 177 AUt. 506 (1935).
85. ULMAN, op. cit. supra note 75, at 264.
86. E.g. Commonwealth v. Halleron, 163 Pa. Super. 583, 63 A.2d 140 (1949);
Commonwealth v. Ricci, 161 Pa. Super. 193, 54 A.2d 51 (1947).
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only basic and fundamental error.87 The harmless error rule, to be con-
sidered later, would, in essence, reverse a case only for basic and funda-
mental errors. Though the courts probably use the basic and fundamental
formulations in different fashions for the purposes of exceptions and harm-
less error, it would appear that if an error rises to the height of being
prejudicial, the appeal court will consider it irrespective of whether an
exception was taken on trial or not.
The purpose of the "exception rule", it is said, is to enable the trial
court to correct errors in the first instance. Counsel who does not except
to basic and fundamental error on trial may be in a better position than
if he took an exception,-for if he excepts and the trial court corrects
such error, it will not serve as a basis for reversal on appeal. If he re-
mains silent, the appeal court will consider it, notwithstanding his failure
to take an exception below, and it might serve as a basis for reversal.
Moreover the Pennsylvania court very often finds itself in this strange
position. It pays lip service to the "exception rule", but considers the
error assigned anyway and finds it without merit.88 The basic fallacy in
the whole area is appeal court insistence that trial counsel are devious
tricksters, more interested in building a case for appeal than winning it on
the trial level. A more plausible explanation of failure to take exceptions
may lie in the incompetence of counsel below. Bound by the court's
adherence to the rule, counsel have been forced to take countless exceptions
for fear that they will be remiss in their duty to their clients if they
do not.8 9
The American Law Institute offers a more logical way to deal with
the problem. It would not make the taking of an exception on trial the
operative feature in determining which rulings on trial the appeal court will
consider. Rather, it provides that the appeal court should review "all
rulings and orders appearing in the appeal papers, in so far as it is neces-
sary to do so in order to pass upon the grounds for appeal." 90 The National
Conference of Judicial Councils has recommended the absolute abolition of
the use of the exception. 91 The procedure of several forward looking
87. E..g, "Where only a general exception is taken to the charge, the single issue
of basic error is raised." Commonwealth v. Kniel, 150 Pa. Super. 290, 28 A.2d 326
(1942). Some commentators have indicated that PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1197
(Purdon, 1931) was designed to abrogate this rule, but the courts have consistently
adhered to it.
88. E.g., Commonwealth v. McGurk, 105 Pa. Super. 383, 161 AtI. 473 (1932);
Commonwealth v. Norris, 87 Pa. Super. 61, 65 (1925).
89. Campbell, supra note 77, at 91.
90. CoD OF CmIxA.L PRocEDURE § 457 (1930).
91. "The yapping 'Except!' which has characterized many trials for so long a
time is now recognized as a mere formal and needless feature of the proceedings.
Accordingly, it has been discarded in two or three states and in the new Federal
Rules of Practice." Report of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evi-
dence of the National Conf erence of Judicial Councils in VANDERBILT, MINIMUm
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 562-3 (1949).
jurisdictions, including the federal courts,9 2 and several states 93 is in accord
with these recommendations. It would appear that this is an appropriate
field for legislative action in Pennsylvania.
Statewnt of Questions Involved.-Counsel face a further limitation
on the errors which the Pennsylvania appellate courts will consider. Fail-
ure to embrace the error properly in the statement of questions may re-
sult in loss of the appeal. Prior to July 1, 1949, the function of pre-
senting error to the court was served by two devices, the statement of
questions involved and the assignment of errors. Form of the assign-
ment of errors was regulated by a galaxy of court rules, all presenting
pitfalls for unwary counsel,94 but these rules have been abrogated. 5
Conceivably, any device used to present error to the appellate court
might serve two functions. On one hand, it might serve as a means of
putting the court and appellee on notice as to the grounds for appeal. On
the other hand, the presentation of error to the court, might serve as a
limitation on the questions which the court might consider. Pennsylvania,
as opposed to the recommendations of the National Conference of Judicial
Councils, utilizes assiinments of error as a limitation on the scope of
questions to be considered.9 6 Both that organization and the American
Law Institute 9 7 maintain that assignments of error should primarily serve
as a means of -notice and that counsel should be penalized only where fail-
ure to assign worked a prejudice on the appellee, as where he had no
previous notice of the grounds for appeal.
Because the statement of questions has replaced the function of assign-
ments of error in Pennsylvania, it is valuable to refer to the old law govern-
ing assignments of error, for in all, probability similar doctrines will be
applied to the statement of questions. The rigid rule that the court would
not consider error not properly assigned,9 8 often put the court in the posi-
92. "Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary and for all
purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary, it is sufficient that
a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known
to the court the action which he desires the court to take, or his objection to the
action of the court and the grounds therefore; but if a party has no opportunity to
object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice
him." FED. R. C, m. P. 51.
93. E.g., CAr. PEN. CODE § 1259 (Deering, 1941); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1046,
28.1053 (Henderson, 1938) ; OHiao GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 11560, 13442-7 (Page, 1938).
94. The old Court rules 23 to 37 regulated the form and content of assignments
of error.
95. By order of both the Superior and the Supreme Courts, Court Rules 23 to
37 which regulated the form of assignments of error were repealed as of July 1, 1949.
96. ". . . assignments of error should be required prior to making up the record
on appeal only when the appellant proposes to omit some portions of the proceedings
and record of the trial court, and that in other cases error as well as cross error
should be assigned only in the briefs in the form of points relied upon for reversal.
This is the method adopted by the new Federal rules. Assignments of error made
otherwise than in the briefs should not constitute limitation upon the scope of review
except so far as may be necessary to protect the parties from actual prejudice."
Report of the Committee on Simplification and Improvement of Appellate Practice
of the Natioal Conference of Judicial Councils in VANDE BiLT, op. cit. supra note
91, at 411.
97. CODE OF CRI3INAL PROCEDURE § 435 (1930).
98. Commonwealth v. 3 Halves of Beer, 162 Pa. Super. 191, 56 A.2d 333 (1948).
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tion of making illogical refinements on the basic rule. Sometimes, the court
considered and rejected the alleged error notwithstanding lack of assign-
ment,99 but said that such defect of itself was fatal, even though considera-
tion was given to the claim. By court rules, the power was reserved to the
court to consider in its discretion any error not assigned or improperly
assigned, if an exception was taken below and the interests of justice were
to be served by considering it.'00 Further, the court considered error
though not assigned, if such error was basic and fundamental,01 which
formulation presented a logical paradox. If the court reversed only for
basic and fundamental error, then such error need not have been assigned,
for the court would have considered it irrespective of assignment. If prop-
erly assigned, and not basic and fundamental, then assignment served no
purpose for it would not serve as a basis for reversal.10 2
Now the statement of questions serves the function which assignments
of error previously served. Finding that counsel were obfuscating issues
on appeal by extensive and complex histories of the case in appeal briefs,
the Pennsylvania appellate courts laid down stringent rules regarding the
filing of a statement of questions involved in the appeal with the appeal
brief. 10 3 Stringent limitations were imposed on the length and content of
the statement.10 4 Space restrictions have been retained by new court
rules. 0 5
It is said that such provisions are mandatory and that an appeal will be
quashed for failure to comply with the court rules, even a murder appeal.' 00
However, the rule has been disregarded in many instances, especially in
criminal appeals. In one recent case there was a 70 page statement of
questions filed but the appeal was not quashed.'
07
Designed originally to present the case in a logical fashion, the re-
quirement has had the unfortunate effect of evolving into another procedural
limitation on the scope of appeal. It is commonly stated that errors not
99. "Notwithstanding appellant's failure to assign the final judgment and sentence
of the court below as error, which is of itself fatal on this appeal, his contentions
have been considered and found to be without merit." Commonwealth v. Zeigler,
164 Pa. Super. 82, 85, 63 A.2d 128, 129 (1949).
100. Former PA. SUPER. Cr. RuLE 37.
101. E.g., Note this unusual statement: "Upon a careful review of the record in
this unusual case, we have reached the conclusion that it should be retried in order
to safeguard the administration of justice between the Commonwealth and these ap-
pellants. Our decision is not based upon any specific assignments of error but upon
the broad ground that the case was not tried fully and carefully as the gravity of
the charge and the dangerous character of the evidence introduced and relied on by
the Commonwealth demanded." Commonwealth v. Derembeis, 120 Pa. Super. 158,
182 Atl. 85 (1935).
102. It is to be noted that precluding consideration of error because it is not basic
and fundamental worked hardship where no particular error was basic and funda-
mental, but many errors considered cumulatively called for reversal. Commonwealth
v. Balles, 160 Pa. Super. 148, 50 A.2d 729 (1946).
103. Von Moschzisker, A Time-Saving Method of Stating in Appellate Briefs,
The Controlling Questions for Decision, 34 YAE L.J. 287 (1925).
104. Former PA. SuPREmE and PA. SuPER. CT. RULES 50.
105. PA. SuPREmE CT. RULE 34; PA. SuPmE. CT. RuLE 34.
106. Commonwealth v. Strail, 220 Pa. 483, 484, 69 At. 866 (1908).
107. Commonwealth v. Kumitis, 167 Pa. Super. 184, 74 A.2d 741 (1950).
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embraced by the statement of questions will not be considered. 08 The
court has made exceptions to the rule in the same fashion as it has with
exceptions and assignments of error, i.e., basic and fundamental error will
be considered, notwithstanding failure to include it in the statement of
questions. 109
In all probability, abolition of assignments of error will have the effect
of broadening the scope of appeal, for it is possible to comprehend more
error in a broadly stated question than in a narrow assignment of error.
The danger still exists that the court may use the statement of questions
to constrict the scope of appeal. This would be an unfortunate step back-
ward. The court should not be precluded from consideration of error by
such mechanical considerations as a statement of questions, when the error
is before the court and the Commonwealth is not prejudiced by failure to
include it.
CONSIDERATION OF TRIAL COURT ERROR
A recent study of homicide appeals in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court revealed a surprising reluctance on the part of that court to reverse
convictions in capital cases in the presence of trial court error, the court
frequently using concepts of harmless error to support its position. It was
found that since the date of Commonwealth, v. Jones,"x0 to the date of the
study that the Supreme Court had affirmed twenty-seven straight cases of
appeals from death sentences. Eight of these cases involved what the court
considered to be non-prejudicial error on the trial level, aside from cases
in which error was present, but had been cured in some fashion below.",
Supplementary to that study, the writer undertook an analysis of the
consideration of error in the great body of cases other than felonious
homicides. Largely, this involved consideration of decisions in the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court."2
108. Commonwealth v. Cauffiel, 298 Pa. 319, 148 AUt. 311 (1929).
109. Commonwealth v. Diagicobbe, 85 Pa. Super. 305 (1925).
110. 355 Pa. 594, 50 A.2d 342 (1947).
111. Note, Reversible Error in Murder Cases and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 814 (1951).
112. The writer made a study of criminal cases reported in the Pennsylvania
Superior Court reports-from volume 160-169 covering a period of 5 years from
1947-1951. The statistical results of such study are reflected in the following tables:
TABLE III
REvERSALS IN CRImINAL APPEALS
Volume of Number of Number of Non prejudicial Error-
Pa. Super. Ct. Cases Cases Error But
Reports Affirmed Reversed Present Cured
160 5 10 1 1
161 10 1 3 0
162 12 2 3 0
163 12 5 1 1
164 11 1 2 0
165 9 2 2 1
166 17 4 1 3
167 11 2 1 6
168 14 3 1 0
169 15 2 2 0
Totals 116 32 17 12
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Harmless Error.-The device developed by appellate courts for han-
dling the substantive consideration of trial error has been the doctrine of
TABLE IV
APPEALS FROM HABEAS CoRpus DENIALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
Volume of Habeas Corpus Habeas Corpus
Pa. Super. Denial Denial












It is interesting to compare these figures with the number of reversals in civil
cases and in appeals in criminal cases prosecuted by the Commonwealth.
TABLE V
REVERSALS IN CIVIL APPEALS
Volume of Number of Number of
Pa. Super. Cases Cases













APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES BY THE COMMONWEALTH
Volume of Number of Number of
Pa. Super. Cases Cases












For the period studied, there were 32 out of 148 criminal appeals reversed or a per-
centage of 28.3%. During the same period 26.1% of all civil causes appealed
were reversed. However, it must be pointed out that volume 160 exerted an unusual
influence on the percentage of criminal cases reversed. If this volume's effect is dis-
carded, then there would be a percentage reversal of 16.5%. Noteworthy, also is the
fact that in cases involving appeals from habeas corpus denials by lower courts, the
percentage of reversal was only 11.5%o. This is to be compared with a 50% reversal
harmless error. The doctrine is a reflection of public indignation at the
great number of reversals in criminal cases on technical errors.113 Prior
to the evolution of the doctrine, it was commonly stated that there was a
presumption of prejudice whenever any error appeared at the trial level.114
The consequence of such a formulation was an undue number of reversals
in criminal cases.115 Feeling that the interests of justice did not demand
a reversal if the defendant had not been harmed by the commission of the
error, many jurisdictions adopted statutes and constitutional mandates
which stated that no case was to be reversed on appeal for the commission
of error unless such error was prejudicial or harmful.11 6
Pennsylvania is one of the jurisdictions where the standard of harm-
less error has been enunciated by the courts. Pennsylvania has never
adhered to a doctrine that prejudice was to be presumed from any error
of law in criminal cases, but had adhered to some kind of harmless error
doctrine from the time in which it became possible to review criminal cases
by a bill of exceptions.11 7  In Commonwealth v. Fife,s18 the Court made
it known that it would not reverse a case merely because of the presence of
error on trial. Defendant had to show that "he may have been injured"
by error below.
There have been a number of verbal formulations of the doctrine of
harmless error which have been fashionable with the court. The Supreme
Court, at present, adheres to a formula which would require that the error
be such as to deprive the defendant of a "fair trial" for it to be deemed
prejudicia -11 9 The Superior Court does not have a propensity to use any
one verbal formula, but uses a number.-e.g., "The charge of the court
considered in its entirety is free from fundamental error." 12; "it (improper
remarks by the district attorney) played no real part in the verdict." 11;
in appeals in criminal cases prosecuted by the Commonwealth. This is to be expected,
however as appeals by the Commonwealth are generally interlocutory in nature and
involve questions of law, as opposed to evidentiary matters-and are prosecuted with
selectivity, where the Commonwealth anticipates success.
113. OprnxD, op. cit. mipra note 3, at 182 et seq.
114. Crease v. Barrett, 1 C.M. & R. 919, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835).
115. For example, in California, study had indicated that the number of criminal
reversals dipped sharply after the adoption of the harmless error provision of the
California Constitution. In 1850 there was a percentage reversal of 50.5% which had
dropped to 14.7% in 1926. Vernier & Selig, Reversal of Criminal Cases it the Sit-
prente Court of California, 20 J. CRIm. LAw & CRImiNOLOGY 60, 63 (1929).
116. E.g., "No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case, on
the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of
evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any
matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evi-
dence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in
a miscarriage of justice." CAL. CoNsT. Art. VI, §4 (Treadwell 1931).
117. As prior to this time the scope of appeal was very narrow, e.g., errors in
the admission or rejection of evidence could not be reviewed, there was no need for a
doctrine of harmless error.
118. 29 Pa. 429 (1857).
119. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947) ; Commonwealth
v. Barnak, 357 Pa. 391, 54 A.2d 865 (1947).
120. Commonwealth v. Kumitis, 167 Pa. Super. 184, 74 A.2d 741 (1950).
121. Commonwealth v. Comer, 167 Pa. Super. 537, 76 A.2d 233 (1950).
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". .. unless the exercise of this discretion results in apparent injury, it
is not grounds for reversal."' 22 At times the Superior Court has adopted
the "fair trial" doctrine of the Supreme Court.'3 The most comprehen-
sive statement of harmless error in the Pennsylvania Superior Court is
found in Commonwealth v. Blose. 24 The court uses several criteria here:
". .. that the determination of the question whether prejudice indelibly
and hurtfully permeated the trial depends in the final analysis upon the
facts of the individual case." The court then incorporated by reference the
formulation of Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States,1' which
statement is becoming increasingly popular with the Superior Court.126
.. . If when all is said and done the conviction (court?) is sure that
the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict
and the judgment should stand. . . It is rather . . . whether the error
itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the
conviction cannot stand."
This formula appears to place great emphasis on whether a reasonable
jury might have been affected by the error in question. But an enter-
prising semanticist could find any number of doctrines there, none of them
consistent with each other. Verbal doctrines in this area are meaningless
as a guide to what the court means by harmless error. We must look
at the application of the formulas to the cases in order to ascertain their
real meaning.
Non-doctrinal application of "harmless error".-In its extended dis-
cussion of harmless error in Commonwealth v. Blose, the Superior Court
recognized that there are three distinct types of cases in which the doctrine
might have relevance. First, there is that class of cases in which the
prosecution has made out a case by the "necessary minimum evidence
legally sufficient to support a conviction." In this situation, the court will
not apply the harmless error rule, for that doctrine was "not intended to
save such a verdict from appellate condemnation." Second, there is that
class of cases in which the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. In this situa-
tion the court will apply the harmless error rule, for thereby the "cause
of justice is promoted" without harm to the "defendant's legal right to a
fair trial." Third, there is that class of cases which falls in between these
two classes. This class is the largest class and the court recognizes that
whether or not the rule will be applied depends upon the particular case.
It is apparent that in this area the appellate court wields great power,
being able to affirm or reverse a conviction on grounds not open to criticism
by simply labeling error prejudicial or non-prejudicial. Indeed, it is some-
times very difficult to tell on what basis the court deemed error harmless,
122. Commonwealth v. Fine, 166 Pa. Super. 109, 70 A.2d 677 (1950).
123. "The ruling of the court did not contribute to his conviction, nor deprive
appellant of the fundamentals of a fair trial." Commonwealth v. Edelman, 162 Pa.
Super. 313, 318, 57 A.2d 603 (1948).
124. 160 Pa. Super. 165, 50 A.2d 742 (1947).
125. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
126. Commonwealth v. Wadley, 169 Pa. Super. 490 (1951).
from the very fact that the court will simply say that it has found no
prejudicial error. e.g., "There was no fundamental error in the charge." 127
One judge has indicated that he thinks that appellate courts utilize
harmless error as an auxiliary tool to their independent determination of
the guilt of the defendant, i.e., the appeal court independently reviews the
evidence, makes a determination as to the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant-then scans the record to find error which it terms harmless if it feels
conviction was justified, or prejudicial if it wishes to reverse. 28
A recent study of homicide appeals in Pennsylvania.indicated that
the Supreme Court was swayed too much by its own independent deter-
mination of guilt. As a result, it was laying down a constrictive applica-
tion of harmless error which was placing an insurmountable burden on
defendants to override a court-constructed presumption that all error was
harmless. 129  This conclusion seems too broad. While the attitude is
reflected in some of the cases, more purpose exists behind the rule than
mere rubber stamping trial court convictions whenever the court feels that
the defendant was justly convicted. A look at the cases will indicate some
of these purposes.
Harmless error as applied in the cases.-In Commonwealth v.
Comer," 0 defendants were convicted of burglary. Puring direct examina-
tion, defendant testified that he had not been in any "trouble" for the past
12 years. The prosecution was permitted to put in evidence on cross-
examination, a record of defendant's prior arrests. In summation to the
jury, the prosecution referred to defendant as a "thief". The Superior
Court affirmed conviction, ruling that while ordinarily the prosecution has
no right to cross-examine on arrests as opposed to convictions, defendant
had opened the door to such cross-examination by his direct testimony.
The prosecution's remarks were found to be error, but harmless error.
That the court's predetermination of defendant's guilt was weighty in its
decision is apparent from its treatment of defendant's alibi. It said,
"Naturally the jury did not credit his version, he being an experienced
criminal." Further, one infers that the court wasn't troubled by the
prosecution's improper remark, because defendant was a thief.
Improper remarks rarely serve as a basis for reversal. The only type
of case where improper remarks carry any weight is a case where other
error is present and its effect is cumulative.' 13 The appellate court feels
that in the ordinary case the effect of such error is negligible. If one pur-
pose of reversing is to discipline the prosecution and the trial court, then
failure to reverse for improper remarks frustrates the design. Improper
remarks are the most commonly alleged error in criminal appeals and are
127. Commonwealth v. Kumitis, 167 Pa. Super. 184, 74 A.2d 741 (1950).
128. ULMAN, op. cit. mtpra note 75, at 266 (1936).
129. Note, 99 U. oF PA. L. REv. 814 (1950).
130. 167 Pa. Super. 537, 76 A.2d 233 (1950).
131. Commonwealth v. Craemer, 168 Pa. Super. 1, 76 A.2d 661 (1950).
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almost universally deemed harmless.1 3 2  Likewise, technical defects in
pleading and indictments rarely serve as a basis for reversal.13
Another case illustrating independent appellate determination of guilt
is Commonwealth v. Sarkis.184 In this case, the prosecuting witness in
an assault and battery charge, testified that he had been beaten in a fair
fight. The Commonwealth pleaded surprise, introducing inconsistent state-
ments of the witness to show that he had received a malicious, brutal beat-
ing. The beating was the outgrowth of the witness's activities in the num-
bers racket, and administered because of a suspicion that the witness had
turned informer. In the absence of a request, the trial court failed to
charge that such testimony was not to be considered substantively, but only
as affecting the witness's credibility. The Superior Court affirmed, ruling
that the failure of the court so to charge was not prejudicial error in the
absence of a request. More likely the court felt that the disparity in the
witness's story was induced by outside pressure. The case is to be com-
pared with Commonwealth v. Nowalk,185 where in a rape prosecution, the
court found prejudice in the failure to lay a proper foundation before the
Commonwealth pleaded surprise. The court intimated that before the
Commonwealth would be permitted to utilize a claim of surprise, the proper
safeguards would have to be observed. In the area of pleading surprise,
for purpose of introducing contradictory statements, nothing is more essen-
tial as a safeguard than that the jury be properly apprised of the weight
to be given such evidence.
Very often, the court will reverse where it feels that is more desirable
that precedent be maintained and trial courts disciplined, than that a par-
ticular defendant be convicted. The error in question must be of a com-
paratively serious nature. It has been shown the court will not reverse
where the error is of a technical nature, the court feeling that mere labeling
of the action as error, without reversal has the desired disciplinary effect.13 6
The clearest example of reversal for purposes of maintaining precedent,
notwithstanding apparent guilt, is reversal for trial court failure to adhere
to established precedents in charging the jury on such things as reasonable
doubt. In Commonwealth v. Tachoir,13' conviction was reversed for a
subtle trial court deviation from the approved charge on reasonable doubt
as laid down in Commonwealth v. Kluska.188 The Superior Court didn't
even discuss the merits of the case. It was also indicated that the charge
of the trial court on circumstantial evidence was defective for failure to
adhere to approved precedents. It is doubtful whether the nice distinction
between the trial court charge and the approved charge would be appreciated
by the jury. In the area of the weight to be given an alibi, the Superior
132. Note, Harmless Error Ride Reviewed, 47 Cou, L. REv. 450, 451 (1947).
133. Commonwealth v. Kumitis, 167 Pa. Super. 184, 74 A.2d 741 (1950).
134. 164 Pa. Super. 194, 63 A.2d 360 (1949).
135. 160 Pa. Super. 88, 50 A.2d 115 (1946).
136. Commonwealth v. Polens, 327 Pa. 554, 194 Atl. 652 (1937).
137. 166 Pa. Super. 239, 70 A.2d 474 (1950).
138. 333 Pa. 65, 3 A.2d 398 (1938).
Court has exacted compliance with the approved form of charge by reversal
for failure to adhere to such precedents,8 9 the court saying, "It is important
that trial courts do not extemporaneously define such matters as reason-
able doubt . .. , alibi and other required matters."
But in Commonwealth v. Statti,14° the court indicafed that the trial
court's charge on reasonable doubt was inadequate in its failure to take
the form of approved precedents, and further that the defendant could not
take advantage of such inadequacy, if it were error, because he took only
a general exception to the charge. Supposedly, a general exception
reaches basic and fundamental error. That the same type of error is con-
sidered basic and fundamental in one case, and non-prejudicial in another
can only be explained on the grounds that the court independently thought
the conviction justified.
Closely related are reversals where the motive is to exact proper
procedural safeguards on the part of trial courts. In Commonwealth v.
Roberts,141 reversal was based on the lower court's failure to explain an
obvious ambiguity in one witness's testimony to the jury. Said the court,
"Had he . . . we would have been disposed to overrule the assignment
of error." '4 Significant in this case, was the fact that evidence of defend-
ant's guilt was not strong. Another factor which carried weight with the
court was the feeling that notwithstanding its own determination of guilt,
it could not fairly say that a reasonable jury might not have been influenced
by the error.
A similar feeling pervades Commonwealth v. Wadley.14 Through a
series of bewildering errors, defendant was convicted of mayhem and vari-
ous other offenses in an attempted rape, though the grand jury had neglected
to indict him for mayhem. Though admitting conviction on the mayhem
charge was error, the Commonwealth contended that such error was harm-
less, because testimony making out the crime of mayhem was relevant to
the separate charge of burglary with intent to commit rape. The Superior
Court reversed, because despite an apparently just verdict, it had grave
doubts as to whether the error in question had affected the jury, inasmuch
as it may have been impressed by the fact that the defendant had been tried
on so many charges, when in fact he had not been indicted for one of them.
Significantly, the court again relied on the formulation of "grave doubt"
laid down in Kotteakos v. United States.
In Commonwealth v. Blose, 44 the Superior Court reversed for trial
court failure to withdraw a juror, after a Commonwealth witness, in testify-
ing as to his identification of the defendant from a photograph, remarked,
"He is a little better looking now, because it was a penitentiary photograph."
The trial judge felt that the case was tried in an atmosphere that was ideal
139. Conunonwealth v. Crooks, 166 Pa. Super. 242, 244, 70 A.2d 684 (1950).
140. 166 Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950).
141. 161 Pa. Super. 548, 55 A.2d 577 (1947).
142. Id. at 551.
143. 169 Pa. Super. 490 (1951).
144. 160 Pa. Super. 165, 50 A.2d 742 (1947).
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and further he had explicitly instructed the jury to ignore the testimony.
The court was reprimanded for its failure to indicate to the jury, that it
had been in error in an earlier colloquy with defense counsel as to the
weight to be given certain evidence, though the judge thereafter charged
the jury in accordance with counsel's contentions. Again the court felt
a grave doubt as to whether the errors had had any effect on the jury.
Appraisal of Harmless Error.-To attempt to prognosticate on the
application of harmless error by the Pennsylvania appellate courts is hope-
less. One can only glean certain clues from the cases which are inade-
quate as guides. A primary factor is the weight of the evidence to sus-
tain conviction. Where the evidence is substantial, then it is only in cases
of grave error that the court is likely to reverse. In a case where the
weight of the evidence sustains conviction, but is not weighty, then con-
siderations other than mere commission of error must be shown the court
before it will upset a conviction which it feels is justified by the evidence.
These include: (a) the discipline of trial court procedure; (b) the main-
tenance of certain precedents in the criminal law; (c) the raising of a grave
doubt as to whether the error in question might not have swayed a rea-
sonable jury, notwithstanding that the court feels that conviction was
justified.
CONCLUSION
The criminal appeal in Pennsylvania is hedged in today with
anachronistic limitations which hinder its efficacy as a means of rendering
justice to the accused. The criminal appeal didn't exist with any vigor
in early Pennsylvania law. As a result, its evolution in our system of
jurisprudence was limited in a fashion which deterred its value as an
effective method of review. Extension of the power of the appellate courts
was constricted with rules designed to prevent undue acquisition of control.
For example, the bill of exceptions originally was a device for giving the
court a broader review of trial error than was possible previously under
the writ of error. Being a radical extension of power, courts were not
prone to wander afield from its limitations. The bill of exceptions thus
provided a convenient device for delineating the scope of appeal.
But today the appeal court operates under a different philosophy. The
broadening of appellate review is not regarded today with the same jealous
apprehension that every extension of power was regarded in former days.
Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania courts have adhered in language to concep-
tual historical limitations on its power of review, though groping for un-
necessary and illogical devices to avoid such confining doctrines, where it
seemed that to comply with them would work an injustice. New court
rules making the statement of questions rather than the old assignment of
errors the focal part of appeal pleading is an attempt to avoid the old
constrictions.
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The criminal appeal in Pennsylvania is a one level appeal for most
purposes. The Superior Court makes final determination of appeal issues.
The legislature has provided for a two level appeal in the area of impor-
tant constitutional rights and cases which are significant, in a purely legal
sense aside from the position of the defendant. But the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has left serious constitutional questions to the final determina-
tion of the Superior Court in most cases and in allowing other appeals
has been more concerned with injustices to the individual defendant than
in evolving the criminal law of Pennsylvania, with the result that the
Superior Court is the final arbiter on criminal law and constitutional limi-
tations on criminal procedure.
The latest court rules have made salutary advances in lubricating the
appeal process and affording easier access to the appellate court for the
convicted criminal. Removal of useless formal procedural pitfalls would
clear the area further and aid the appeal process immeasurably as a means
of rendering substantial justice.
Kenneth Syken
